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 Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the evolution of the contemporary rare earth market. The commodity has a 
growing strategic importance in key sectors, including the military-, energy-, high-tech- and 
automobile industry. 90 percent of the global supply has its origin from China, which binds 
buyers around the world to its exports. The evaluation of China’s market strategy illuminates 
the implications on its own supply hegemony and on foreign institutions. Within this context a 
major focus is placed on strategic value chains as well as on price determining factors for the 
rare earths. Both, Japan and the US are the largest consumer beyond Chinese border and are 
mostly active in researching alternative supply sources. Hence, the assessment of groundbreak-
ing approaches to detach from China’s rare earth supremacy is carried out. The analysis out-
come leads to the formulation of a competitive strategy for foreign market participants. Ulti-
mately, the results of the examination show that the recapture of strategic value chains needs to 
be incentivized by economic-political measures. This will ensure to countervail against the price 
dependency, which is at the present days the main stimulus for the search of alternative supply 
sources. 
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 Preface 
 
The human being invented in the past centuries pioneering machines and business processes to 
leverage the output of human capacities, which eventually led to the industrial revolution. In the 
present days the world experiences the growing integration of technologies in businesses and 
private households. The digital age already reached many people around the world with an up-
ward trend. Technologies that facilitate such a vast array of products and services depend heavi-
ly on rare earth metals (REM). These elements are virtually invisible components but play a 
significant role in smartphones, computers and many other related gadgets. 
The first time I took a closer look on rare earths was in 2012 as part of a research project for 
students. Since then I continued reading and researching about the impact on our daily life, the 
influence on businesses and economic opportunities and risks that derive from the usage of such 
elements.  
This bachelor thesis shall be my first step to enter a research field of great potentials for discov-
eries and further contribution to conceive the mutual coherence of business economics and 
technology. 
I would like to thank all people that encouraged me to continue working on this as well as con-
tributed to the development of my interest field. Thanks to my beloved ones including my fami-
ly, specially my brother and my fiancé. Furthermore I thank Michael Keaney and William 
Simcoe, both my lecturers from Metropolia Business School Helsinki, that have taught me stra-
tegic research tools as well as critical evaluation of the data. 
I am expressing my special thank to my thesis advisor from the Berlin School of Economics and 
Law Professor Doctor Hansjörg Herr and the second proofreader Behzad Azarhoushang, which 
guided and advised me throughout the research period. 
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1 Introduction 
 
David Ricardo describes in his literature "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" that 
the welfare of all participating countries increases if each economy specializes in the production 
of goods with a comparative advantage1. His idea from 1817 has been changed dramatically. In 
today's world businesses outsource partial or complete operations abroad in order to increase 
their profit margins. Driven by the shareholder value, a number of multinational corporations 
achieve annual returns that exceed the GDP’s of entire economies2.  
Yet, entities depend on imported raw materials and other resources to create competitive and 
profitable goods and services. Especially high-tech firms have made themselves increasingly 
dependent from virtually invisible parts of their products. The so-called rare earth elements play 
a central role in the development of new high tech inventions but are essential for already estab-
lished technologies. In order to achieve an advantage and thus to succeed in a highly competi-
tive and dynamic market environment, the race for sustainable supply of rare earths takes place 
between China and the rest of the world. 
 
1.1 Methodology 
 
This thesis examines China's disrupting rare earth strategy and the ramification on its market 
supremacy as well as on foreign institutions3. Hence, the analysis determines arising supply 
chain approaches to cope with the contemporary market situation. Various stages of the up- and 
downstream supply chain will be illuminated within the course of the analysis4.  
A concentrated focus is placed on affected industries of the United States of America as well as 
Japan5. Both countries count amongst the largest consumer beyond Chinese border as a result of 
their pronounced high-tech manufacturing and depending industries, which have significant 
economic implications for their own and the global economy. 
                                                      
1 Heine, M. and Herr, H. (2012). Volkswirtschaftslehre: Paradigmenorientierte Einführung in die Mikro- 
und Makroökonomie. München: Oldenbourg. pp.661-662 
2 Trivett, V. (2011). 25 US Mega Corporations: Where They Rank If They Were Countries. [online] 
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-bigger-tan-countries-2011-6?op=1&IR=T 
[Accessed 11 Apr. 2015]. 
3 The term “foreign institutions” refers to countries and their enterprises that are located beyond Chinese 
border with main emphasis on the USA and Japan. 
4 Bailey Grasso, V. (2013). Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and 
Options for Congress. Congressional Research Service, [online] 7-5700(R41744), p.14. Available at: 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41744.pdf [Accessed 18 Apr. 2015]. 
5 King, H. (2015). REE - Rare Earth Elements - Metals, Minerals, Mining, Uses. [online] Available at: 
http://geology.com/articles/rare-earth-elements/ [Accessed 28 Feb. 2015]. 
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The previous reading has shown that the USA and Japan make strong efforts to compete with 
China's rare earth market approach. At the same time both countries have fundamental differ-
ences in their economic pattern that is reflected in their corporate governance regime6. Due to 
the common efforts and the contrasts of their government systems, both countries will be recog-
nized as the representative selection for this thesis. A closer examination on other countries and 
their industries will not be undertaken in this study due to scope limitation and dilution avoid-
ance to the represented examples. However, the analyzed market situation, including strategic 
measures to overcome the current rare earth market difficulties may be applicable to other coun-
tries as well.  
In order to facilitate an in depth market evaluation the research methodology comprises qualita-
tive and quantitative statistics as well as an expert interview. By applying these three approach-
es the market assessment takes place from different angles. Implementing this measure will 
ensure an ultimate conformity and quality of the gathered data.  
Primary as well as secondary sources will be used for the data collection. These include litera-
tures and electronic publications, including scholarly journals, magazines and online newspaper 
articles. A particularly important source is Michael Porter’s literature Competitive Strategy: 
Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. It functions as the fundamental basis for 
this analysis offering theoretical and structural guidelines, models to examine market forces and 
tools to assess the feasibility of supply alternatives. 
Michael Heine’s and Hansjörg Herr’s economic literature “Volkswirtschaftslehre: Paradig-
menorientierte Einführung in die Mikro- und Makroökonomie” will be considered as the main 
source for economic term explanations due to its emphasized theoretical elaboration of relevant 
topics. Furthermore the expert opinion of Mr. Karl Gschneidner serves as a parameter for the 
comparison of the evaluated data7. 
Primary sources that provide the actual data about the rare earth market are the U.S. Geological 
Survey as well as the annual reports of various REE producers. Amongst important and reliable 
secondary sources are the Mineral Commodity Summaries, CRS Reports for Congress and the 
Financial Times newspaper. These particular sources make a significant contribution to this 
thesis due to their up-to-dateness and credibility, thus allowing a qualitative data evaluation.  
The analysis starts with the introduction where the current market situation is briefly reflected 
and is followed by the definition of rare earths. This crucial step gives the reader a first over-
view about the topic, which will enhance the understanding for the strategic importance of rare 
earths within the context of the value chain reclamation. 
                                                      
6 Hulsink, W. (1998). Privatisation and liberalisation in European telecommunications. London: Rout-
ledge, pp.51-52. 
7 Mr. Gschneidner is Professor in the Department of Materials Science and Engineering at the Iowa State 
University. He founded the Rare Earth Information Center in 1966. With over 60 years of experience in 
this field, Mr. Gschneidner is considered as the world’s most important rare earth expert. 
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The main body of the analysis is subdivided into three parts, starting firstly with the evaluation 
of the historical data, secondly the application of Porter’s Five Forces Model and thirdly the 
formulation of a competitive strategy.  
The first objective of the historical data analysis is to determine key factors for the rare earth 
market evolution and thereafter China's strategy for entering and attaining the market leader-
ship, which exists down to the present day. Carrying out this phase allows to analyze how mar-
ket forces have evolved and furthermore how a quasi-monopoly impacts the global trade of rare 
earths. These results enhance the understanding for the formation of the current market structure 
and contribute substantially to the development of a competitive strategy.  
The analysis of the current rare earth market examination utilizes Porter’s Five Forces Model 
and within this context evaluates the interrelationship between the market participants and the 
commodity. This measure allows an adequate differentiation of each forces bargaining power. 
The implementation of Porter’s model begins with the assessment of the supplier side that com-
prises an evaluation of its market position. Unlike the buyer, the supplier provides the market 
with the raw material as well as the end product in several forms and functionalities and thus 
receives more extensive examination. The analysis of the buyer side involves the assessment of 
its influence on supply and price formation will be allocated. Subsequently, the rare earth de-
mand driver will be determined and the mutual interference with supplier presented.  
The third essential step comprises the analysis of new entrants. In this context the required time 
and the associated costs for entering the supplier market will be determined. Particularly the 
political and legal conditions, technological expertise, resource constraints and environmental 
restrictions will be discussed in detail.  
The fourth section assesses the substitutability of rare earth elements. Essential focus is placed 
on a comparison of REM’s and other available and feasible materials8. In this manner, the as-
sessment of the research progress for alternative materials is enhanced. The substitutability 
analysis shows the potential threats to China's rare earth hegemony. It furthermore clarifies ef-
forts and importance for foreign countries to recapture strategic value chains. In addition, the 
coherence between rare earth metals and technologies that have the capability to leverage eco-
nomic activities will be provided. Moreover the rare earth recycling is considered amongst the 
substitutions as well.  
The competitive rivalry will be analyzed in the final stage of the Five Forces analysis. The as-
sessment enhances the comprehension for the mutual interactions of the market forces. It further 
functions as the groundwork for the formulation of a competitive strategy for institutions be-
yond China. Eventually, the strategy formulation takes place through the implementation of an 
external benchmarking with the airline industry.  
                                                      
8 Referring to the phrase “other available and feasible materials”: It comprises naturally occuring and syn-
thetic materials. 
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The last part of the thesis stresses the economic implications of the high-tech industry and its 
far-reaching effects on businesses, consumers and thus the global economy for the year 2025. 
The high-tech industry is chosen due to its high dependency on rare earth elements. The final 
outcome of the analysis provides an essential contribution to the understanding of international 
efforts nowadays to detach from China’s predominant supply.  
Based on the analysis procedure described above, the research question “Does China’s rare 
earth strategy disrupt its quasi-monopoly and thereby stimulate innovative supply approaches 
in the global rare earth market?” will be proven on its stability. The thesis statement has been 
developed to support the evaluation of the question and reads as follows: “Foreign institutions 
take advantage of China's disrupting rare earth policies to recapture strategic value chains 
and secure the supply of their growing demand”. 
 
1.2 Brief Market Overview  
 
Rare earth elements are an indispensable part in the daily life of technologically advanced socie-
ties. This commodity accelerates innovations and is applied in various industries, ranging from 
commercial to military products, including consumer electronics, green technologies and de-
fense systems9. Beyond that, its application takes place in heavy industries including steel-, 
catalyst- and the glass manufacturing10.  
Research and development (R&D) of alternative supply sources have been neglected until China 
started to restrict its exports in 2005 despite international demand growth. That levered up price 
volatility and supply shortages. In early 2015, after ten years of export restrictions on rare 
earths, China lifted the regulations due to the conclusion of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) that such measures violate against global trade rules11. Partly responsible for the coun-
try’s strategic realignment is China’s growing domestic demand12. The contemporary market 
situation is largely responsible for the urge to find alternative and sustainable supply solutions 
in order to overcome the current and potential future scarcities of this strategic commodity13. 
                                                      
9 Foote, B. (2014). How China Is Creating Rare Earth Investment Opportunities in the U.S.. [online] 
Fool.com. Available at: http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/07/how-china-is-creating-rare-
earth-us-investment-opp.aspx [Accessed 31 May 2015]. 
10 Humphries, M. (2013). Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain. Congressional Research 
Service, [online] 7-5700(R41347), p.5. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf 
[Accessed 9 Apr. 2015]. 
11 Beattie, A. (2015). Rare earths and China’s self-correcting folly. [online] Financial Times. Available 
at: http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/08/rare-earths-and-chinas-self-correcting-folly/ [Accessed 31 
May 2015]. 
12 Jamasmie, C. (2014). China to soon lift restrictions on rare earth exports | MINING.com. [online] 
MINING.com. Available at: http://www.mining.com/china-in-no-hurry-to-lift-restrictions-on-rare-earth-
exports-92539/ [Accessed 31 May 2015]. 
13 The term “institution” refers to as countries and firms 
Rare Earth Term Definition  5 
 
 
That is in a direct linkage to the operating efficiency of firms and economic stability of coun-
tries. The following chapters will provide an explicit examination of the points referred to 
above. 
 
1.3 Rare Earth Term Definition 
 
The rare earths are 17 difficult to mine minerals, which comprise scandium, yttrium and fifteen 
lanthanides. These commodities are not as rare as their name may imply14. They are available all 
over the world mainly in the earth's crust. In fact, the two least abundant rare earths Thulium 
and Lutetium are 200 times more common than gold15. 
However, they do not appear in greater concentrated volumes everywhere and moreover the 
production and refining process is toxic, radioactive, costly and complicated that bring negative 
externalities in large quantities to the environment and has deleterious effects for every living 
being16. In addition, not all mines achieve an acceptable cut-off grade, which represents the 
required minimum value to consider a mine economically feasible17. Moreover, governmental 
regulations impede the establishment of feasible and reliable supplies, which is an additional 
reason for their naming.  
Figure 1 (p.6) shows major applications that depend on these elements. Not visible in the first 
place is the differentiation of light and heavy rare earths. The distinction between light (LREE) 
and heavy (HREE) rare earth metals indicates the atomic number, which defines physical and 
chemical properties18. Heavy rare earths are less abundant than the lighter ones but at the same 
time are more frequently used in a wider range of applications despite their scarcity19.  
                                                      
14 Following acronyms will be used in the context: rare earths, rare earth elements, rare earth oxides, RE, 
REE, REO, minerals, metals, strategic metals, lanthanides, commodities 
15 Mills, R. (2011). Rare Earths from Mine to Magnet | Resource Investor. [online] 
Resourceinvestor.com. Available at: http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2011/06/17/rare-earths-from-mine-
to-magnet [Accessed 31 May 2015]. 
16 Foote, B. (2014). 
17 Molycorp Inc., and United States Securities And Exchange Commission, (2014). Annual Report 
Pursuant to Section 13 Or 15(D) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2013. [online] Washington, D.C., p.139. Available at: http://www.molycorp.com/investors/ 
[Accessed 10 May 2015]. 
18 MILLS, R. (2011).  
19 The term “scarcity” refers to the market availability of the commodity, rather than the actual natural 
occurrence  
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Figure 1 - The many uses of rare earths: Most common application areas. Source: Molycorp Inc., (n.d.).  
 
Around five percent of all mined rare earths are heavy and commercially important20. They find 
major end use in hybrid engines, lasers, screens, surface alloys and medical devices. These ap-
plications make use of the HREE’s on a large scale21.  
LREE’s are abundant and comprise about 95 percent of all mined rare earths. However, they 
find fewer applications in the industries. They are used i.a. in laptops, headphones, TV-
coloration and auto catalysts and are subordinated to “Glass”, “Catalysts” and “Other” applica-
tions, as Figure 1 displays.  
At the present days the only country that is able to produce heavy rare earths on a larger scale is 
China. This is possible not least because of its highly competitive prices, very low production 
costs and fewer environmental regulations22. According to the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) of 2013 China possesses at the present days about 41 million tons (37 percent) of the 
110 million tons of the global rare earth deposits and supplies the world with over 90 percent of 
all rare earths23. 
                                                      
20 National Research Council Of The National Academies, (2008). Minerals, Critical Minerals, And The 
U.S. Economy. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, p.89. 
21 Humphries, M. (2013).  
22 Wayne, M. and Tang, R. (2012). p.8-13 
23 Krishna-Hensel, S. (2012). New Security Frontiers: Critical Energy and the Resource Challenge. 
Farnham: Ashgate, pp.120-121. 
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1.4 Rare Earth: By-Product And Joint-Product 
 
The rare earth commercialization process starts in the early 1950’s through its implementation 
in the iron industry, which will be comprehensively examined in the next chapter. However, its 
initial commercial appearance in the steel manufacturing takes place as a by-product. At that 
time, rare earth is not the main driver for mining, but rather it is iron.  
By-products are defined as goods that are extracted from a superior or main product24. Hence, 
the material value of the by-product derives from the main product25. The separation process of 
certain by-products is more expensive and thus increases the market price, which in the case of 
rare earths exceeds the price of the steel, as it will be discussed in the relevant chapters26. Even 
if the by-product has a comparatively more expensive market price, it is not perceived as the 
main, but rather as a minor income source for firms. The stage at which rare earths are separated 
from the iron is called split-off point27. Until that point the costs for production are considered 
as overheads. Only after the split-off, costs are directly attributable to the rare earth. Therefore 
separate cost or price specification for individual REE’s is not given. This is an important note 
to bear in mind for the understanding of cost and market price composition.  
However, by-products must not be underestimated despite their apparent minor importance. 
Besides being complementary revenue sources they increase the overall production costs, since 
additional steps are required to extract the by-product28. Therefore it complicates the real costs 
as well as profits that are made with the trade of rare earths as by-products. Subsequently, the 
cost allocation is too burdensome and therefore within the course of the analysis only one gen-
eral price for rare earths will be stated29. 
To sum up, rare earths are the subsidiary products that evolve from the production of a main 
good while the by-product output is strongly connected to its superior good30. 
                                                      
24 Siegel, J. and Shim, J. (2000). Accounting handbook. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, 
pp.103-104. 
25 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, (n.d.). Joint Products & By Products. 1st ed. [PDF] 
pp.1-4. Available at: Available at: http://www.icaiknowledgegateway.org/littledms/folder1/module-2-
chapter10.pdf. [Accessed 22 Apr. 2015]. 
26 U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Iron and steel statistics, in DiFrancesco, C.A., Kelly, T.D., Bleiwas, 
D.I., and Fenton, M.D., comps., Historical statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United 
States (2012 version): U.S. Geological Survey Data Series 140. [online] Available at: 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/historical-statistics/. [Accessed 15 April 2015];  
U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Rare earth statistics, in Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., comps., Historical 
statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States (2012 version): U.S. Geological 
Survey Data Series 140. [online] Available at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/historical-
statistics/. [Accessed 15 April 2015]. 
27 Siegel, Joel G., and Jae K. Shim.(2012). p.212 
28 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. (n.d.). 
29 This implies that there will be no price differentiation for each rare earth. 
30 Ibid. 
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The most common feature of joint- and by-products is that both share the same source of origin. 
From the accounting perspective the operation costs of joint products are perceived also as 
overheads until the split-off point that subsequently makes them individual goods31.  
Other than by-products, joint products represent equal income sources for the company. Sec-
ondly, they are characterized by their equality in production and refining process32. Therefore, 
none of the joint products is superior or subordinated. To put it briefly, if more than one product 
with an equal value contribution for a company results from the same process, then it is called 
joint product. For example, nowadays, rare earths and iron are partly perceived as joint prod-
ucts. Both commodities are the main and equal driver for the mining and production and con-
tribute in the same way to a company’s success33. 
At this point it should be noted that rare earths have a unique characteristic in terms of their 
product type. In Japan, where the contemporary rare earth recovery takes place from metal scrap 
on a large scale, the commodity is considered as a by-product according to accounting stand-
ards34. Some iron ores in the US produce REE’s as well but due to low concentration in the near 
earth crust, the commodity is considered as a by-product. On the other hand, China's largest rare 
earth mine Bayan-Obo is mining and refining rare earth metals besides iron, reflecting the typi-
cal properties of a joint-product operation35. The market evolution impacts the circumstance 
whether the REE is considered a by- or joint-product. That will be analyzed in the next three 
chapters.  
 
                                                      
31 Siegel, Joel G., and Jae K. Shim.(2012). p. 212 
32 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. (n.d.). 
33 EPA, (2012). Rare Earth Elements: A Review of Production, Processing, Recycling, and Associated 
Environmental Issues. United States Environmental Agency, [online] pp.2-4. Available at: 
http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P100EUBC.pdf [Accessed 8 Apr. 2015]. 
34 Alex, K. (2012). Cost Processing. In: Cost Accounting. 1st ed. [ebook] Pearson Education in South 
Asia, pp.566-567. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/518777/ 
IPOL_STU%282015%29518777_EN.pdf [Accessed 22 Apr. 2015]. 
35 Gupta, C. and Krishnamurthy, N. (2005). Extractive metallurgy of rare earths. Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC 
Press, pp.119-129. 
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2 Historical Development Of The Rare Earth Market 
 
2.1 The Rare Earth Market From 1950 To 1980 
 
This paragraph ana-
lyzes the rare earth 
market with a concen-
trated focus on the 
period from 1950 to 
1980 and can be rec-
ognized as the first 
phase of the market 
evolution. The initial 
market entrants, the 
formation of competitors and a significant increase of rare earth production take place around 
that timeframe due to the commercial deployment of these metals, as Figure 2 displays36.  
Back in the middle of the 20th Century the rare earth market did not exist as it does nowadays. 
Rare earths were considered as by-products of the iron mining37. The Mountain Pass in the 
United States, which was discovered in the late 1940’s, is at that time the largest rare earths 
mining deposit, producing around 2000 metric tons annually38.  
However, Figure 2 shows specially until the mid 1960’s no strong differentiation of producer 
but rather summarizes them under the term “Other”. Since rare earths are the by-product of iron, 
they found first major application in the steel industry adding stainless, alloying features and 
increasing the electric steel grade of metal products39. Although the trend towards incorporation 
of REE’s increased due to further inventions and discoveries, the acceptance for them was still 
low because of the complicated recovery as well as their availability40.  
                                                      
36 Gschneidner, K. (2015). 
37 Els, F. (2014). China's rare earth industry will look very different in 5 months | MINING.com. [online] 
MINING.com. Available at: http://www.mining.com/chinas-rare-earth-industry-will-look-very-different-
at-the-end-of-the-year-53315/ [Accessed 31 May 2015]. 
38 Gschneidner, K. (2011). Rare Earths - Crucial Elements of Advanced Technologies. Material Matters, 
[online] 6(2), p.32. Available at: http://www.sigmaaldrich.com/content/dam/sigma-aldrich/materials-
science/material-matters/material_matters_v6n2.pdf [Accessed 14 Apr. 2015]. 
39 Lampman, J. and Peters, A. (1981). Ferroalloys and other additives to liquid iron and steel. 
Philadelphia, Pa. (1916 Race St., Philadelphia 19103): ASTM. p. 100-102 
40 Ibid. 
Figure 2 - Rare earth production eras. Source: Gschneidner, K. (2011). 
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Starting from around 1965 the US increases its outputs significantly and floods the market with 
rare earths, incentivized by additional application possibilities in steel products but also by the 
color television, which was introduced at that time. Specifically, the dramatic rise in 1968 is a 
result of the enhanced understanding of applications and side effects of rare earths. 
The supply was still dominated by the US with annual outputs of approximately 15.000 to 
20.000 tons (see Figure 3), which is around 13 to 18 percent of today's production41. In contrast, 
China's production volume in the mid 1970’s of 1000 tons is only a fraction of the US output. 
Canadian and US steel companies mainly drove rare earth consumption.  
Two key factors influenced the demand in the iron and steel industry and thus shaped the buyer 
market dramatically in the early 1970’s. These are firstly the increased availability of rare 
earths. Secondly, the learning curves of rare earth applications in the steel industry accompanied 
by innovations in the steel manufacturing42. Firms without rare earth experience were often 
deterred from using these metals because of failures; others however improved their products 
drastically. These advancements influence the high-rise-building-, airplane- and car manufactur-
ing positively. 
                                                      
41 The calculation is based on the annual output of 110.000 metric tons in 2014 according to the U.S. 
Geological Survey of 2015 on page 129.; 
U.S. Geological Survey, (2015). Mineral Commodity Summaries 2015, [online] p.129. Available at: 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2015/mcs2015.pdf [Accessed 7 Apr. 2015]. 
42 Lampman, J. and Peters, A. (1981). pp.100-102 
Figure 3 - Global rare earth production in comparison to iron and steel between 1944 and 2012. Source: 
Chart compiled by Kadir Ider according to US Geological Survey, (2014).  
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It must also be pointed out that there is a clear correlation of both mentioned key factors. The 
deployment of rare earth was at that time influenced to a large extent by the advancements of 
the steel industry, which enabled broader applications of REE’s. At the same time, the discovery 
of the rare earth potentials encouraged more supply as well as demand.  
In 1972 the consumption rises around the world, primarily due to Japanese and European steel 
companies43. Over 90 percent of the worldwide rare earth usage is driven by the steel industry, 
mainly due to pipeline production44. Noticeable is that up to this point the steel industry com-
monly used so-called “mischmetal”, known as a combination of several rare earths. It can be 
therefore summarized that a targeted use of each rare earth type is not upheld due to technologi-
cal limitations as well as massive production costs for rare earths45.  
The growth trend of supply and demand was followed by a sharp decline caused by the oil crisis 
in 1973. In fact, the oil shock triggered the recession in the US as well as Europe and Japan, 
thus reflecting the susceptibility of rare earths towards oil46.  
However, the effect of the global economic deterioration on the rare earth consumption becomes 
noticeable after 1974, clearly reflected in both, Figure 2 and 3. Demand plunge because new 
orders were drying up and demand remained weak. This affected the supply of rare earths to the 
same degree. Specifically the manufacturing and construction industry, that involves the pro-
cessing of steel are most exposed to crisis47. The effects of that particular sector on the rare earth 
production can summarize the strong evidence that the steel industry was playing an essential 
part in the rare earth deployment. Therefore it can be assumed that the striking parallels and 
mutual interactions of both, the steel- and REE manufacturing show a positive correlation. 
Eventually, until the late 1970’s the rare earth consumption recovers and is in terms of supply 
and demand volumes on the same level as it was before the crisis.  
 
Summarized, this paragraph analyzed the first phase of the rare earth market evolution. It can 
be ascertained that the steel industry played the initial role in the expansion of these metals. 
Strategic benefits, technological limits and thus the potential of this market from the perspective 
of its early stage are identified. In addition it can be concluded with respect to the market forces 
that the US dominated the market. Towards the end of the 1970’s diversification took place 
through an increase of entrants causing the enlargement of global supply and demand.  
                                                      
43 Lampman, J. and Peters, A. (1981). P.100 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. p.104 
46 Macalister, T. (2011). Background: What caused the 1970s oil price shock?. [online] The Guardian. 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/mar/03/1970s-oil-price-shock [Accessed 14 
Apr. 2015]. 
47 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, (2013). Impact of the 
crisis on industrial relations, [online] p.14. Available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/ 
default/files/ef_files/docs/eiro/tn1301019s/tn1301019s.pdf [Accessed 15 Apr. 2015]. 
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Furthermore, according to the theory available in Heine’s and Herr’s economic book “Volks-
wirtschaftslehre” a direct quantitative relationship of two variables expresses the degree of elas-
ticity48. Applied on rare earths it can be concluded that due to its nature of being a by-product of 
iron, its production will correlate strongly with the iron industry. This conclusion is supported 
by the evidence that the underlying economic situation influences the steel industry, which itself 
determines the rare earth production strongly, since a diverse application of REE’s was limited 
as the analysis of Figure 2 and 3 reveals49.  
 
2.2 China's Market Penetration 1980 To 2000 
 
A closer examination of China's market entrance will be made from 1980 to 2000. This period 
may be considered as the second phase of the rare earth market evolution and most relevant for 
China's participation that changed the marketplace substantially. In addition, the aggregated data 
until the 1980’s is based on estimates since there are not enough sufficient statistics about Chi-
na's rare earth exploitation operations50. Nonetheless, the pre-1980 
period with focus on China will be outlined briefly to offer an 
enhanced picture of the market penetration. China's rare earth 
production started in 1957, producing rare earths as a by-product 
of iron but on a much smaller scale than in the US51. As discov-
ered in the previous paragraph, the Chinese mine “Bayan Obo” 
achieves an annual production volume of 1.000 tons only in the 
late 1970’s, which is less than a quarter of the output of the Moun-
tain Pass mine52. A sudden price hike that is followed by fluctua-
tions characterizes the price development in the 1970’s as Table 1 
shows53. 
                                                      
48 Heine, M. and Herr, H. (2012). p.43 
49 U.S. Geological Survey, (2014). Rare earth statistics 
50 Gupta, C. and Krishnamurthy, N. (2005). pp.119. 
51 Hao, Z., Li, Y., Li, H., Wei, B., Liao, X., Liang, T. and Yu, J. (2015). Levels of rare earth elements, 
heavy metals and uranium in a population living in Baiyun Obo, Inner Mongolia, China: A pilot study. 
Chemosphere 128, [online] pp.161-170. Available at: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
272524156_Levels_of_rare_earth_elements_heavy_metals_and_uranium_in_a_population_living_in_Bai
yun_Obo_Inner_Mongolia_China_A_pilot_study. [Accessed 19 March 2014].; 
EPA, (2012). Rare Earth Elements: A Review of Production, Processing, Recycling, and Associated 
Environmental Issues. United States Environmental Agency, [online] pp.2-4. Available at: 
http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P100EUBC.pdf [Accessed 8 Apr. 2015]. 
52 Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). Economic and Trade Implications for the United States: China’s 
Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime, pp. 9-10. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
R42510.pdf [Accessed 19 March 2014]. 
53 U.S. Geological Survey, (2014). Rare earth statistics 
Table 1 - Rare earth price 
development between 1968 
and 1977. Source: U.S. Geo-
logical Survey, (2014). 
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Prices increase at a rate of 1000 
percent from around US$ 400 in 
1968 up to US$ 4000 on its peek in 
1976. Despite the increasing pro-
duction of rare earths, the prices are 
not developing proportionally (see 
Figure 4). According to the theory, 
elasticity of a good and the gradient 
are not correlating, which is an addi-
tional evident that rare earth prices 
and supply do not interact directly54. 
Rather, the rare earth metals seem to 
have a low but positive price elastic-
ity of supply (PES) because the increase in supply does not affect their price development 
strongly, as Figure 4 shows. It can be concluded for the market in the 1980’s that the supply of 
rare earths correlates with the steel supply but the price development of rare earth is not in a 
direct linkage to the steel price (see Figure 3).  
However, a strong indicator for the rising price tendency in the late 1970’s that lasted into the 
next decade is particularly due to the inflation adjustment and increasing operation costs55. Sub-
sequently, the adjustment is not the primary source for the rising demand but rather has its na-
ture in the entire economic activities. Since demand is one component of the economic activities 
and thus influences the market condition as well, it plays an essential role in the implementation 
of inflation adjusting measures and thus must not be underestimated.  
The other component that causes sharp price rises is the cost of operations. Reason therefore is 
the shift from rare earth applications into the heavy industry, including “mischmetal” and other 
similar products towards a more targeted implementation into electronic devices in the 1980’s56. 
Further value adding steps increase the value of the commodity on the one hand but the down-
side is the increasing costs due to an enlarged supply chain.  
 
                                                      
54 Png, I. (2002). Managerial economics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. p. 129-131 
55 U.S. Geological Survey, (2013). Statistical Compendium - RARE EARTHS. [online] Minerals.usgs.gov. 
Available at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/stat/ [Accessed 31 May 
2015]. 
56 U.S. Geological Survey, (2013). Statistical Compendium - Rare Earths. [online] Minerals.usgs.gov. 
Available at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/stat/ [Accessed 31 May 
2015].; 
McManus, M. (2012). What are rare earth elements – and what do they have to do with the environment? 
- HowStuffWorks. [online] HowStuffWorks. Available at: http://science.howstuffworks.com/ 
environmental/green-science/rare-earth-elements.htm [Accessed 31 May 2015]. 
Figure 4 - Rare earth price development in USD per metric tone 
from 1947 to 2012. Source: Chart by Kadir Ider according to U.S. 
Geological Survey, (2014). 
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Although operation prices in the rest of the world (RoW) rise until 1985, China is able to pro-
duce and supply rare earth metals due to a subsidization program by the government, effecting 
the undercutting of the global prices57. At the same time in the RoW supply and demand decline 
due to the avoidance of rare earth containing catalysts that are used for petroleum cracking caus-
ing a rebound of the entire rare earth market until the end of the 1980’s 58. 
The usage of rare earths declines elsewhere, while China's market opening increases steadily its 
integration into global economic activities and attracts foreign investors. The positive effects of 
China's rural industrialization are besides the orientation towards global market also the increas-
ing domestic demand for goods and thus its output of iron respectively its by-product rare 
earth59.  
Particularly the effects on the US economy are clearly visible according to a statistic of the Re-
search Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) and China.org.cn, an official Chinese 
government portal, showing the mutual impacts of China's and US industrial production60.  
In 1980’s China expands its rare earth production further, which leads to price drops just as 
caused by the US between 1950’s and 1970’s as displayed in Figure 4. This is not only possible 
due to China's annual output that is around 6.000 tons in 1982 and rises to 20.000 tons in 
198561. That represents an annual increase of more than 100 percent based on the initial amount. 
More important is the export discount for rare earths that is part of the subsidization program 
that promotes further exports62. Eventually, China outpaces the US in terms of rare earth pro-
duction and global supply around 1985. This time frame represents also the intersection of Chi-
na's and the US’s rare earth production, as Figure 2 displays. Until this point China keeps its 
annual rare earth output moderate in a global comparison63.  
It can be recognized that China is taking gradually control over the rare earth supply market. Its 
aggressive market strategy leads to an increase in supply and demand. Furthermore the refor-
mation of China’s economic system enabled foreigners to invest in the country and access a 
labor market that is cost-effective in the global comparison. Beside that, the technological ad-
vancements since the late 1980’s increased the need of cheap production sources that benefited 
China’s reformations additionally. 
                                                      
57 McManus, M. (2012). 
58 McManus, M. (2012).; U.S. Geological Survey, (2013). Statistical Compendium - Rare Earths. 
59 Bramall, C. (2007). Industrialization of rural China. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.261-263. 
60 Ross, J, (2013). China's new industrial revolution - China.org.cn. [online] China.org.cn. Available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-08/27/content_29838533.htm [Accessed 31 May 2015].; 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), (2002). Column: China's Industrialization 
and Japan's De-industrialization. [online] RIETI. Available at: http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/ 
02101101.html [Accessed 20 Apr. 2015]. 
61 Gupta, C. and Krishnamurthy, N. (2005). pp.119-120 
62 Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). pp. 8-10 
63 Gupta, C. and Krishnamurthy, N. (2005). Extractive metallurgy of rare earths. Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC 
Press, pp.119-120 
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China's strength, its abundant rare earth resources as well as the competitive market factors in-
cluding cheap labor and low environmental regulations triggered and catalyzed its increasing 
participation in the market.  
The annual output of China is in the late 1980’s around 30.000 tons, which is an increase of 
almost 40 percent compared to the previous year. Thus representing for the first time since its 
market entrance a hegemonial supply power64. This second wave of increased production in 
1994 leads simultaneously to a further weakening of its main rival, the US based producer. Due 
to governmental support and increasing profit margins for Chinese companies in the rare earth 
market, many Chinese startups established businesses in this industry. As a consequence, prices 
decline over the course of the 1990’s until the early 2000’s, as Figure 4 (p.13) shows.  
In 1995 China produces nearly 50.000 tons reflecting a 67 percent increase in comparison to the 
preceding year65. Despite sharp demand growth, the excess capacities in China cause an abun-
dant availability in the global market at a price range that eliminates gradually rare earth pro-
ducer in other countries66. Moreover, China's intense investment in research and development 
contributes largely to the advancement of technologies for rare earth production and usage67. 
The state-of-the-art facilities enable the country to cover the entire supply chain process that 
comprises mining-, separation-, refinement-, formation- and manufacturing68.  
The downside of China's strategy is that domestic competition fragments the entire market in-
cluding the destruction of foreign competitors. The lucrative profits that existed to date are be-
coming significantly smaller incentivizing the shift from official mining and trading towards 
illegal exploitation and smuggling. Towards the late 1990’s China possesses thousands of 
mines, many illegally established in order to avoid any safety and environmental regulations.  
Other companies in China minimize the processing to such an extent that the rare earth would 
fall into another category and thus exempting the export from the restrictions69. Nevertheless, 
the main incentive is the profit maximization that gradually decreases because of high competi-
tion70. The increased production level experiences a slight drop due to the financial crisis in 
Asia in 1997. However, despite the setback it has limited effects on the expansion of the rare 
earth production. According to the Federal Reserve, as soon as institutions (whether countries or 
enterprises) seem to be or actually become insolvent, the pressure leads to a market shakeout71.  
                                                      
64 Gupta, C. and Krishnamurthy, N. (2005). pp.119-120 
65 Calculated as following: ((50.000*100)/30.000) -100  = 66.67 percent 
66 Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). p.10 
67 Ibid. 
68 Bailey Grasso, V. (2013). p.14. 
69 Beattie, A. (2015). 
70 Bailey Grasso, V. (2013). p.11 
71 Fernald, J. and Babson, O. (1999). Why Has China Survived the Asian Crisis So Well? What Risks 
Remain?. SSRN Journal, [online] pp.7-8. Available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/1999/ 
633/ifdp633.pdf [Accessed 4 Apr. 2015]. 
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The self-adjusting mechanism does not apply to Chinese enterprises, thus exempts the country 
from greater economic damages during that crisis72. Unlike many other Asian countries China 
continues to increase its economic activities, including the expansion of the infrastructure 
providing even better access to rare earths.  
Therefore, in 1998 China picks up its production faster than its global competitors and reaches 
an annual output of 75.000 tons73. China's market penetration with very low prices causes preda-
tory pricing and destructive competition74. Due to liberal market rules in the Western countries 
Chinese companies penetrate the markets under facilitated conditions75.  
Additionally, China's largest rare earth producer are state-owned, state-controlled and receive 
subsidies while the US corporations are privately run enterprises, which are additionally tight to 
governmental as well as environmental policies76. Nonetheless, the US based companies are not 
only outperformed by China's prices, but also due to increasing environmental regulations re-
quired by the US government that essentially complicates the rare earth production. This re-
flects as well the price increases for REE’s sold by the US producer77. Despite that, the US is 
able to supply enough rare earths for its own demand. 
By this time, the global rare earth supply is mainly driven by seven Chinese mines, all special-
ized in the production of different kinds of rare earths78. The largest amongst them, the Bayan 
Obo mine, accounts for about 95 percent of China's known deposits and 50 percent of its entire 
output. This mine incorporates light rare earths (LREE) and iron as equal products. The other 
mines are chiefly responsible for the more strategic heavy rare earths (HREE). Nonetheless, 
there are other mines around the world that possess capacities but size and volume are not 
known79. China is the only country that is able to supply heavy and light rare earths in any pro-
cessed form80.  
 
                                                      
72 Fernald, J. and Babson, O. (1999). pp.7-8. 
73 U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Rare earth statistics. 
74 Bradsher, K. (2010). Molycorp Places Risky Bet on Rare Minerals. [online] Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/04/22/business/energy-environment/22rare.html?_r=0 [Accessed 16 Apr. 
2015]. 
75 Peixe, J. (2013). US Begins Mining Rare Earth Elements after more than 10 Years. [online] 
OilPrice.com. Available at: http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/US-Begins-Mining-
Rare-Earth-Elements-after-more-than-10- Years.html [Accessed 20 Apr. 2015]. 
76 Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). pp. 8-10 
77 Dembosky, A. (2011). Search for rare-earth self-sufficiency. [online] Available at: http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/9604d932-7b38-11e0-9b06-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XTf4aTef [Accessed 16 Apr. 2015]. 
78 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia, (2012).  
79 Gupta, C. and Krishnamurthy, N. (2005). pp.122-123 
80 Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). pp. 8-10 
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Summarized, China’s competitive strength in the REE production, the substantial differences 
of environmental requirements, the increasing global cost pressure for other REE producer ena-
bled China to become the predominant supplier, which exists down to the present day. The in-
centivizing measures that China took in the 1980’s and 1990’s lead to a sharp increase of rare 
earth producer and volume. The strategy proves itself as successful with regards to the global 
market leadership acquisition. However, the production and export outflows control apparently 
failed considering the fact that China is known for its state directed corporate governance81.  
The apparent abundant availability in the 1980’s and 1990’s and technological innovations as-
sociated with large earning potentials have incentivized companies worldwide for stronger inte-
gration of these metals82. According to Heine’s and Herr’s literature “Volkswirtschaftslehre” a 
monopoly is present if one enterprise is the sole supplier of a specific good in a market83. Since 
other suppliers are operating during this time period as well, China should be rather seen as the 
main actor in an oligopolistic market.  
All in all, China's market penetration can be recognized as a strategic move in the right place 
and at the right time. The country realizes the rapidly growing demand and trend towards 
stronger integration of REE’s in the 1980’s. Not only has it established a rare earth hegemony, 
which includes the entire supply chain but also created a hub for the production of rare earth 
depending products. 
 
2.3 Effects Of A Market Hegemony 2000 To 2014 
 
This paragraph analyzes the effects of a concentrated market structure with main focus on the 
period 2000 to 2014. Aim is to illuminate the coherence of the global rare earth sector and the 
ramifications of China's market strategy. Therefore this section is subdivided into two parts, 
starting with the effects on the domestic market and thereafter the impacts on foreign countries. 
As already discovered in previous paragraphs, the rare earth output correlates strongly with the 
iron exploitation. Since the 1980’s China is a steel importer but does not import rare earths at 
that time84. 
However, that may be seen as an early sign of China's domestic demand growth for rare earths 
that eventually exceeds its own production volume, which subsequently puts China into the 
position of a net importer and thus makes the country dependent on foreign supplier85.  
                                                      
81 Brink, A. (2011). Corporate governance and business ethics. Dordrecht: Springer, pp.17-20. 
82 Hedrick, J. (1999). Rare Earths. U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook - 1999, [online] pp.61.4-
61.5. Available at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/740499.pdf [Accessed 
10 Apr. 2015]. 
83  Heine, M. and Herr, H. (2012). p.107-108 
84 Wits Basin Precious Minerals, (2013). 
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After becoming the primary source of the worldwide supply China starts to quote its exports in 
2005, three years after the Californian based Mining Corporation Molycorp stops its REE ex-
ploitation (in 2002). China's rare earth regulations range from domestic restrictions to export 
barriers in order to regain control over the domestic rare earth market. That has a major impact 
on the global REE supply due to the large dependency of the world on China.  
Within the framework of the new regulations China consolidates several mines that operate 
illegally. In addition, it is from each mining company required to achieve a minimum produc-
tion volume of 20.000 metric tons annually86. Moreover, each production company has to have a 
fixed-asset investment (FAI) of 20 percent at least, which measures the investments in physical 
assets that are held in the company for more than one year87.  
The country initially possesses about 1000 mines that merge or are acquired by the state, which 
leads to the shutdown of 70 percent of all mines88. Additionally, ⅓ out of 23 remaining REE 
mines and the half (= 50 facilities) of the smelting processors in China will be shut down subse-
quent to the new regulations89. Another indicator for China's strategic move is to prevent further 
expansion of illegal mining that captures around 15 to 30 percent of China's domestic rare earth 
sector90. The increasing illegal exports are responsible for tremendous environmental damages 
such as radioactive contamination and groundwater pollution, which has long-term environmen-
tal and financial consequences91. Taking furthermore into account that China's own demand for 
rare earths is predicted to grow steadily, a sustainable exploitation may not be guaranteed if the 
sector stays insufficiently regulated.  
                                                                                                                                                              
85 Shen, H. (2014). Chinese imported rare earth metal ores, prices show an upward trend. | InvestorIntel. 
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The Chinese government published in a white paper its political interest to protect their rare 
earth resources92. Furthermore, China's ecological awareness is according to the published paper 
another major reason for its export restrictions. This course of action should encourage other 
nations to extend the capabilities of rare earth element supplies. There is a radical disagreement 
between China as the major supplier and its foreign customers. Since the USA and Japan are the 
largest consumer, their concerns and ambitions to ensure a constant supply of REE’s is enor-
mous93.  
Notably the US and Japan perceive the Chinese government actions as an undesirable obstacle. 
Japan has experienced an export embargo that had massive impacts on its highly technology 
driven industries94. While further restrictions for REE exports are implemented, the worldwide 
demand keeps rising that soars up the prices. The high demand and the lack of supply in the 
global market changes the perception of the rare earths. Until the early 2000’s the metals seem 
to be abundant in terms of their market availability, prices were relatively low.  
China aims to be more conscious about environmental protection in order to create a sustainable 
exploitation. However, China's domestic rare earth market reformation has significant implica-
tions on the global supply particularly between 2005 and 2010. Its restrictions raise the aware-
ness of foreign buyers for the need of alternative supplies95. China argued the case that the 
world has been drawing primarily on its resources although rare earth deposits can be found in 
large quantities elsewhere. Since the domestic demand of the metals is rising dramatically, con-
sequently China has an interest to save its deposits in order to supply its industries sufficiently. 
Nevertheless, this is interpreted from the rest of the world as an unfair move that enhances Chi-
na's competitive advantage96.  
In contrast, export restriction measures have been taken by the US to protect their shale oil and 
gas resources in order to meet domestic demand97. The US, which is one of the largest oil pro-
ducer in the world, influences global prices for oil to a large extent with its strategic measures 
that however, has not been acknowledged as a violation of WTO laws98.  
                                                      
92 The People’s Republic of China, (2010). Situation and Policies of China’s Rare Earth Industry. 
[online] English.gov.cn. Available at: http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/ 
content_281474983043156.htm [Accessed 23 Apr. 2015]. 
93 Extavour, M. (2011). Rare Earth Elements: High Demand, Uncertain Supply | Optics & Photonics 
News. [online] Osa-opn.org. Available at: http://www.osa-opn.org/home/articles/volume_22/issue_7/ 
features/rare_earth_elements_ high_demand,_uncertain_supply/#.VTjqFa2qqko [Accessed 23 Apr. 2015]. 
94 Humphries, M. (2013). pp.17-18. 
95 Politi, J. (2014). WTO rules against China on ‘rare earths’ export restrictions - FT.com. [online] 
Financial Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/962a0ba4-b4e6-11e3-9166-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3YPmGk86U [Accessed 26 Apr. 2015]. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The Financial Times, (2015). US makes a strategic error in the oil price war - FT.com. [online] 
Financial Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/72f68904-c65c-11e4-add0-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3YPmGk86U [Accessed 26 Apr. 2015]. 
98 Ibid. 
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China’s REE regula-
tions chiefly affect 
domestic mines, as 
highlighted in the pre-
vious section99. There-
fore the tighter control 
of China’s REE pro-
duction can be consi-
dered as an essential 
step for securing do-
mestic supply and beyond that as an improvement of environmental conditions. Further tighten-
ing of the export regulations by Chinese authorities effect nearly a tenfold increase in prices, as 
stated in Table 2. Eventually the price for rare earths is on its all-time high where the cost per 
metric ton exceeds US$ 50.000. Specifically between 2008 and 2012 there is an extreme price 
and demand fluctuation noticeable. This is due to the financial crisis in 2008 causing a drop of 
demand and subsequently a slump of the REE prices.  
Nonetheless, sharp price increases as of 2010 are because of China's export restrictions and the 
supply risks involved100. In addition targeted export embargoes against Japan, which evolve 
from maritime conflicts between both countries impact Japan’s rare earth supply dramatical-
ly101. Many sources argue that China exercises political pressure through large interruptions of 
rare earth exports102. As a result of supply shortages, extreme price volatility and China's REE 
restrictions, it is harder for foreign industries to operate efficient. Notably is that foreign com-
panies defray the costs of China's actions since rare earth prices outside of China are more then 
500 percent higher than for domestically located companies, as Table 2 displays103.  
 
Eventually, in 2012 the US, Japan and the EU accuse China of using unfair practices and bring 
this case to the World Trade Organization (WTO)104. In 2014 the export quotas are lifted in the 
orders of the WTO105.  The Chinese Ministry of Commerce comments on its website following 
statement: 
                                                      
99 Jopson, B. (2014). Crisis in Ukraine reshapes US debate on gas exports - FT.com. [online] Financial 
Times. Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a744e920-a3c7-11e3-88b0-
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100 Polinares, (2012). Fact Sheet: Rare Earths Oxides (REO). EU policy on natural resources, [online] 37, 
p.5. Available at: http://www.polinares.eu/docs/d2-1/polinares_wp2_annex2_factsheet3_v1_10.pdf 
[Accessed 3 May 2015]. 
101 Humphries, M. (2013). pp.17-18. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Wayne, M. and Tang, R. p.27. 
104 Politi, J. (2014). 
105 Beattie, A. (2015). 
Table 2 – Price comparison of rare earth varieties within China and in the rest 
of the world. Source: U.S. Geological Survey, (2014). 
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“[...] The cancelling of the quotas was a specific policy to integrate domestic and foreign mar-
kets and resources, which fully manifested China's decision to give full play of the decisive effect 
of the market in resources allocation. [...] China will continue to strengthen the protection of re-
sources products [...], promote resources and environment protection, safeguard fair competi-
tion and realize sustainable development. 106”  
 
In other words, China will act according to the WTO’s law enforcement and exports its rare 
earths without quotations but countermeasures will be introduced. These comprise the retention 
of export licenses to control the outflows and the introduction of higher resource taxes107. The 
latter measure has direct influence on the pricing of rare earths since the taxes will rise between 
7.5 to 11.5 percent for light rare earths and 27 percent for heavy rare earths108. Companies that 
depend on this commodity but produce beyond Chinese border are particularly affected by the 
new measures.  
Table 3 below summarizes China's motives for its strategic change109. The left column repre-
sents motives that arise from China, whereas the right column lists reasons from abroad that 
influence China's strategic realignment: 
 
 
                                                      
106 Chinese Ministry of Commerce, (2015). Official of Chinese Ministry of Commerce Comments on 
Cancelling Rare Earth Export Quotas. [online] English.mofcom.gov.cn. Available at: 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201501/20150100874624.shtml 
[Accessed 4 May 2015]. 
107 Raybould, A. (2015). China abolishes rare earth export quotas: state media. [online] Reuters. 
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/05/us-china-rareearths-idUSKBN0KE07P20150105 
[Accessed 4 May 2015].;  
BBC, (2015). China scraps quotas on rare earths after WTO complaint - BBC News. [online] BBC News. 
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30678227 [Accessed 4 May 2015]. 
108 Hua, J. and Aizhu, C. (2015). China issues details on new resource tax structure for rare earth, 
metals. [online] Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/30/us-china-rareearth-
resource-tax-idUSKBN0NL12720150430 [Accessed 4 May 2015]. 
109 Table content is based on the research results in this thesis. 
China Rest of the World 
Uncontrolled expansion of domestic market WTO intervention 
Increasing illegal mining around 15 - 30 percent in 
2010  
Increasing competitive advantage towards for-
eign companies 
China's production does not meet the needs of its 
own demand sufficiently 
Influence on global demand and supply 
Rare earth import Strong foreign demand growth trend 
Strong domestic demand growth trend Global price development 
Environmental restrictions Environmental requirements/critique  
Table 3 - Summary of China's motives for its strategic realignment. Source: Kadir Ider 
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Summarized, the analysis of this section shows that the effects of a concentrated ownership in 
the rare earth market are influenced by domestic and international reasons. China's strategic 
actions seem to be restructuring and protection measures of its own rare earth sector. The do-
mestic sector is dominated by three driving factors that include firstly the rapid development of 
rare earth mines and traders, secondly China's gradual loss of market control that it aims to re-
gain through stronger governmental influence. Thirdly, China's rare earth exploitation is associ-
ated with large environmental destruction that the country aims to minimize.  
China's preferred market position is due to its relatively large concentration of rare earths and 
the possession of specific and hard to copy production processes110. This is associated with a 
low price market strategy in its early stage that changes dramatically over the course of the 
2000’s.  
Furthermore the analysis reveals the influence of foreign countries, represented by the WTO. It 
can be concluded that supply shortages of rare earths have a direct link to governmental levels. 
Companies address the issues to the authorities, which, in turn, lodge the complaints to the 
WTO that deals with the trade rules amongst its member states. International interests and pres-
sure show the limits of China's political influence on the rare earth market. This conclusion is 
made considering the fact that the US, Japan and China are all member of the WTO111. If China 
would resign from the membership, its rights and obligations towards other members would 
forfeit.  
Consequently, each individual Chinese producer would be more vulnerable on the market in 
contrast to perceiving all producers as one “Chinese unit”. Considering China as the public cor-
poration, it can be recognized as the main market supplier of rare earths but not as the monopo-
ly. Rather it is a particular form of an oligopoly with one major supplier who dictates the prices. 
As a result the other significantly smaller supplier will follow passively112. 
 
2.4 Hotelling’s Theory Of Non-Renewable Resources 
 
According to Hotelling's Theory, if prices of a non-renewable resource increase faster than pre-
vailing interest rates, producer tend to maximize their production and supply113. This is because 
the yields of these non-renewables would be higher than market returns.  
                                                      
110 Heine, M. and Herr, H. (2012). p.107 
111 The World Trade Organization, (2015). WTO | Understanding the WTO -  members. [online] Wto.org. 
Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [Accessed 4 May 2015]. 
112 Herr, H. (2015). Thesis: Rare Earth Market - Frage zum Thema Monopolstellung. [email]. 
113 Investopedia, (2009). Hotelling's Theory Definition | Investopedia. [online] Investopedia. Available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hotellings-theory.asp [Accessed 5 May 2015]. 
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However, if in the opposite case the price of the non-renewable resource is expected to stay 
below the growth rate of interest rates, it deters producer from bringing out these resources be-
cause market yields offer better returns114. Hotelling’s Theory states that the market mechanism 
is the natural process that adjusts the behavior of producer according to the market conditions. 
This theory is based on the assumption that owner of non-renewables are profit motivated115. 
In order to check if the theory is suitable for the rare earth market, two scenarios will be applied. 
The first scenario comprises an evaluation of the relative price changes including all figures 
while the second scenario evaluates the data after expunging the outliers. The adjustment for the 
statistical outlier is only made for the rare earth prices. This procedure is performed because the 
historical development of the rare earth market has shown extreme price fluctuations in certain 
years.  
 
Scenario 1: 
The price growth rate of rare earths in the first phase (1950 to 1980) is at 32.00 percent, placing 
this rate clearly above the US three-month treasury bills (US T-bill) interest rate that is at 4.50 
percent116. As the historical data analysis reflects, during this time period the rare earth mining 
and price development is higher than the US T-bill. The large divergence between both figures 
confirms Hotelling’s Theory and can be recognized here as proven true117.  
The price growth between 1980 and 2000 continues at a rate of 13.00 percent in the rare earth 
market and 6.60 percent of the US T-bills. The apparent decline of the relative price rate for the 
rare earths is because the prices have been more stable than in the first phase. Here again Ho-
telling’s Theory is applicable, since the growth of rare earth prices is still twice as high relative 
to the market returns. In the third phase (2000 to 2014) a sharp increase of about 36.00 percent 
for the rare earth prices is identified whereas the US T-bills decrease to 1.50 percent. The major 
reason for the rare earth price increase is not the production rate but rather China's export re-
striction that causes a supply bottleneck beyond its borders. 
However, the growth rate of REE’s from 1950 to 2014 is on average 25 percent. According to 
Hotelling’s Theory, the higher yields in the REE market are responsible for the producer’s deci-
sion to extract the resource rather then investing into the markets. 
                                                      
114 Investopedia, (2009). Hotelling's Theory Definition | Investopedia. [online] Investopedia. Available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hotellings-theory.asp [Accessed 5 May 2015]. 
115  Ibid. 
116 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (2013), Selected Interest Rates (Daily) - H.15. Board of 
Governance of the Federal Reserve, in Treasury bills (secondary market) - annual rates. [online] 
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U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Rare earth statistics, in Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., comps., Historical 
statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States (2012 version): U.S. Geological 
Survey Data Series 140. [online] Available at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/historical-
statistics/. [Accessed 15 April 2015]. 
117 The percentage figures are rounded. For more information please see Appendix A and C. 
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It has to be considered that the price changes of rare earths are not solely due to the market 
mechanism but rather because of the direct influence of China. Therefore, Hotelling’s Theory is 
only partly applicable in this case, which shows the limits of this hypothesis. 
 
Scenario 2: 
The rare earth market experiences in its early stage small growth rates, prices remain low, as 
Figure 4 (p.13) displays. The mean of the REE price increase of 3.10 percent is below the US 
three-month treasury bills interest rate of 4.50 percent, which proves Hotelling's Theory118.  
In the second phase the rare earth price is at a growth rate of 3.20 percent and the US T-bills 
interest rate at 6.60 percent and shows that both values are drifting even further apart119. During 
this time period production and supply increase dramatically as shown in Figure 6. Although 
Hotelling’s Theory states that such market constellation discourages producer to extract the 
resource, China does the opposite and floods the market with rare earths120. As a consequence of 
extreme price pressure other participants are pushed out of the market. This controversy shows 
the weakness of Hotelling’s Theory, which is often criticized. Nonetheless the theoretical 
framework establishes a link between non-renewable resources and the entire market. 
The third phase is characterized by rare earth price growth rates of 8.50 percent and US T-bills 
interest rates of 1.50 percent growth121. This phase is the turnaround for the rare earth market. 
Due to the high growth rates of prices associated with the export restrictions the rare earth mar-
ket creates increasingly incentives for other potential entrants.  
On average between 1950 and 2014 the rare earth market grows at a rate of 4.90 whereas the T-
bills are at 4.20 percent122. The comparison of the Federal Reserve's (FED) T-bills and the price 
development of rare earths reinforce the conclusions of the historical data analysis123.  
 
Summarized, the comparison shows the potentials and limits of Hotelling’s Theory. The natu-
ral market adjustment is distorted if only quantitative determinants are considered in the calcula-
tion but not exogenous variables such as China’s interventions. These interventions cause a 
strong distortion of the statistical data evaluation. In fact, after the exclusion of outliers the data 
reveals that the price development of the REE’s and the T-Bills shows only a small deviation. 
                                                      
118 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (2013).; U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Rare earth statistics. 
119 Ibid. 
120 The mean (average) is calculated for each phase individually. Statistical outlier are neglected for rare 
earth prices in Scenario 2, because they cause significant deviations of the results. The relative changes to 
the prior year are calculated firstly. Thereafter the mean of all rates are calculated. For more information 
please refer Appendix A; 
US treasury bills have been taken as an representative example since the US is a major market player in 
the rare earth industry at that time and prices are denominated in USD. 
121 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (2013).; U.S. Geological Survey, (2014). 
122 Please note here, that statistical outlier are neglected for the price development of rare earths as well. 
123 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (2013).; U.S. Geological Survey, (2014). 
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2.5 Interim Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the historical market development has been subdivided into three phases. Phase 
one lasts from 1950 to 1980 and shows that the rare earths evolve as by-products of the iron 
mining. The US becomes the production and supply hub but the range of rare earth applications 
is limited because research is in existence for a short time. Therefore rare earths play a less im-
portant role in industries.  
The second phase exists from 1980 to 2000 and is characterized by China's market penetration 
and increased competition. Furthermore the research and development of rare earth applications 
influence the perception of rare earths since unknown potentials are discovered. Rare earths 
become increasingly relevant in various industries due to further application discoveries because 
the research and development expand the possibilities for their use. China passes its main rival, 
the US, in production capacities and eventually becomes the chief supplier124. In addition, low 
environmental regulations, cheap labor costs, and the utilization of critical intellectual property 
rights of foreign companies enhance China's privileged conditions125. The historical analysis 
reveals that later entrants accumulate their experiences faster than the first market player. Late 
entrants observe and learn from the pioneers and adapt more optimized market strategies associ-
ated with up-to-date technologies 126.  
The third phase starts in 2000 and ends in 2014. This period is characterized by a price and sup-
ply supremacy of China. Rare earths are widely established and indispensable components in 
several industries. In addition the export quotations limit the supply to customers outside China. 
Although the world possesses rich rare earth deposits to produce enough output in order to meet 
global demand but due to political and environmental constraints the setup of manufacturing 
plants takes up to 15 years127. This condition does not ensure sufficient flexibility and reaction 
time for market changes. Rather it creates a time lag, which is responsible for delayed actions128. 
The long lead-time is associated with pre-investments of up to US$ 1 billion to set-up and run a 
mine at its full capacities129. In this respect the extreme competition that results in price pressure 
acts as a disincentive for market entrance. 
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The underlying literature “Minerals, Critical 
Minerals, and the U.S. Economy”, published in 
2008, dates from a period where the export 
restrictions have been existent for three 
years130. Figure 5 displays the criticality of rare 
earth applications within the scope of the sup-
ply restrictions. It should be pointed out, that 
the size of each circle does not reflect quantita-
tive measures. Rather the position indicates the 
susceptibility to supply risk exposure. The 
criticality increases the further the circle moves 
towards the upper-right corner131. The yellow 
circle shows the average mean of all circles. 
The impact of supply restrictions (y-axis) 
scores a 3 out of 4 while the supply risk exposure (x-axis) scores a 4. The high score shows the 
sensitivity of rare earth supply towards the implemented restrictions. Particularly the high-tech 
industry that utilizes the rare earth magnets for the development of innovative products (red 
circle) is mostly exposed to risk. Due to constant demand growth of this sector it can be con-
cluded that small changes in supply or prices have dramatic effects on the availability of REE’s.  
Ultimately, this Figure summarizes visually the conclusion of the historical development. It 
shows primarily the susceptibility of the market towards economic-political regulations. 
                                                      
130 National Research Council of the National Academies, (2008). Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the 
U.S. Economy. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, p.89. 
131 Ibid. p.4. 
Figure 5 – Criticality assessment of rare earth applica-
tions. Source: National Research Council Of The Na-
tional Academies, (2008).  
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3 Porter’s 5 Forces Analysis 
 
This section aims to determine each force’s bargaining power and mutual effects on one another 
in the existing market. The analysis focus will be placed on the competencies and the competi-
tive positions in order to avoid inward-looking perspectives132. The enhanced understanding of 
competitors is necessary for the evaluation of each market player’s position133. 
Economic-political goals, legal and technological necessities will be taken into account as well. 
These include i.a. driving factors for the competition, actions that firms and countries are taking 
to handle supply shortages. Eventually, the analysis of the five forces will provide the important 
data, firstly to detect the strategic value chains and secondly to formulate a competitive strategy 
for institutions beyond China134. 
 
3.1 The Buyer Power 
 
The goal of the buyer side assessment is to detect the types of buyers and to determine their 
influence respectively bargaining power towards the other forces. Within this scope the rele-
vance of rare earths for the entire business operations of the buyers is taken into account. It will 
not be exactly determined, which company is purchasing certain quantities due to the given 
market structure that consists of complex supply chain models, numerous participants and a 
range of geopolitical conditions within several stages of the value chain135.  
Rather a comparison of annual reports of leading Chinese and foreign REE producer (besides 
other sources) is used to assess roughly the global demand distribution. This measure will offer 
an intensified picture of the buyer side136.  
There are seven key factors that are considered for the evaluation that will be analyzed in the 
following subchapters: 
                                                      
132 Porter, M. (1998). p.XXI 
133 Porter, M. (1998). p.XV 
134 Porter, M. (1998). p.XXI 
135 Roskill Information Services, (2015). Roskill: China to Remove Rare Earth Export Taxes in May 
2015. [online] Prnewswire.com. Available at: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/roskill-china-
to-remove- rare-earth-export-taxes-in-may-2015-289574441.html [Accessed 11 May 2015]. 
136 China Rare Earth Holdings Limited, (n.d.). Corporate Profile. [online] Creh.com.hk. Available at: 
http://www.creh.com.hk/eng/ [Accessed 12 May 2015]. 
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3.1.1 Purchase Volumes 
 
Particularly the pur-
chase volumes of 
individual buyers 
relative to seller vol-
umes provide infor-
mation about the bar-
gaining power137. The 
demand and thus the 
purchase volumes 
refer to downstream 
products that integrate 
rare earths138. The development of these downstream markets influences the demand for rare 
earths and therefore reflects a correlation between supply and demand. 
With respect to the consumption by country, China is the largest consumer, followed by Japan 
and the US139. China's domestic demand accounts for about 70 percent of the 225.000 tons 
global consumption140. Although Figure 6 creates the appearance that China is able to meet its 
own demand, it has to be considered that the country is a net importer of certain rare earth types, 
as discovered in the historical analysis (Chapter 2.5.).  
However, in the light of the overall production China produces more REE’s than it consumes. 
The large demand in China is due to the production of REE depending products that are des-
tined for the domestic or foreign markets141. According to the annual report of China Rare Earth 
Holdings Limited (CRE) of 2014, 74 percent of the output is sold in China whereas 26 percent 
is exported, which reflects the data in Figure 6. Furthermore, CRE states that Japan buys around 
five percent of its rare earths. According to the Information Handling Services (IHS) and a 
working paper published by the EU Policy On Natural Resources (POLINARES), it is stated 
that Japan accounts for 20 percent of China's rare earth exports142.  
                                                      
137 Porter, M. (1998). p.24  
138 Molycorp Inc., and United States Securities And Exchange Commission, (2014). p.22 
139 Polinares, (2012). p.3 
140 Based on the estimated data of Figure 6 for 2015, the calculation is conducted as follows: (160.000 x 
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141 China Rare Earth Holdings Limited, (2015). 年 報 Annual Report 2014. [online] Hong Kong, p.41. 
Available at: http://quicktake.morningstar.com/stocknet/secdocuments.aspx?symbol= 
00769&country=hkg [Accessed 12 May 2015]. 
142 Manning, M. (2013). Pricing Instability, Growing Demand and Supply Fears Drive Rare Earth 
Industry as China Dominates Market, Says IHS Study | IHS Online Pressroom. [online] Press.ihs.com. 
Available at: http://press.ihs.com/press-release/country-industry-forecasting-media/pricing-instability-
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Figure 6 – Supply and demand development of China and the rest of the world in 
a comparison. Source: Molycorp Inc., The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, (2010). 
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It can be concluded that CRE’s exports to Japan reflect only a fraction of the total value. Seven 
percent according to CRE are the sales to the US, which is close to the 12 percent according to 
POLINARES143. In accordance with CRE’s annual report of 2014, its largest (sole) customer 
accounts for 20 percent of its sales while the five largest combined around 40 percent144. Both 
figures do not differentiate domestic or foreign customer but it can be assumed that they are 
Chinese based since more than 70 percent of CRE’s sales are staying within the domestic terri-
tory.  
 
3.1.2 Seasonality Of Demand 
 
The demand of rare earths is also influenced by seasonal reasons145. Based on Molycorp’s annu-
al report of 2013 the empirical data shows a strong global decline of rare earth production due to 
Chinese New Year and the Spring Festival period that is celebrated widely in Asia. Therefore 
demand in the first quarter of each year is relatively low, while the strongest demand for rare 
earths is in the third quarter because productions in this period increase due to Christmas. 
The demand in Japan is at the end of the fiscal year in correspondence with the first quarter. 
Due to accounting purposes firms increase their efforts to minimize inventories specifically 
towards the end of the fiscal year. This impacts the value of goods that are kept in stock, which 
affect the payable tax amount146.  
 
3.1.3 Financial Leverage 
 
This paragraph determines the approximate leverage power of rare earths according to each 
application area. Hence, the buyer’s susceptibility towards rare earth supply can be ascertained 
with a better accuracy147. Despite their mere value of around US$ 3 billion, rare earths play an 
essential part in downstream markets, worth US$ 5 trillion in total148. That accounts for almost 7 
percent of the global GDP in 2014149.  
                                                      
143 Manning, M. (2013).; Polinares, (2012). p.3.  
144 China Rare Earth Holdings Limited, (2015). p.41 
145 Molycorp Inc., and United States Securities And Exchange Commission, (2014).  p.9 
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Calculation is made as following (in trillion US$): (5.00 x 100) / 77.00 = 6.5 percent → ≈ 7 percent  
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In the US and Canada alone, the rare earth metals contribute to an annual economic output of 
roughly US$ 350 billion and are responsible for 620.000 jobs150. Considering the global con-
sumption of REE’s, following table reveals the leverage power of rare earths based on the ap-
plication area151. Due to a lack of adequate data it is assumed that the financial leverage is 
equally distributed in each application area. 
 
Application 
Area  
Percentage 
of Total 
Output152  
REE Value 
(in US$ 
billion)153 
Market  
Impact (in 
US$ billion)154  
Financial 
leverage in 
percent155 
End Markets156 
Catalysts 15.50 0.465 775.00 
1700.00 
Oil Refinery Catalysts; Automotive 
Ceramics 5.50  0.165 275.00 Surface Coating 
Glass 6.00  0.180 300.00 High-End Optics 
Magnets 26.00  0.780 1300.00 
Consumer Electronics; Hybrid and 
Electric Vehicles  
Metal Alloys 19.00  0.570 950.00 Green Technologies; Super alloys 
Phosphors 6.00  0.180 300.00 Steel Additives 
Polishing 16.50  0.495 825.00 Glass Polishing 
Other 5.50  0.165 275.00 Water Purification; Healthcare 
Total 100.00  3.00 5000.00 1700.00  
 
 
 
As the table above shows, the rare earths have a financial leverage of around 1700 percent. This 
percentage reflects the impact on rare earths according to the classified category. In other words, 
rare earths account for 0.0006 percent (6 x 10-4) of the purchasing costs that companies in the 
affected markets are paying157. Although REE’s represent only a very small fraction they have 
an enormous impact on the end-market.  
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Table 4 - Financial leverage of rare earths on depending industries. Source: Table compilation and calculation 
by Kadir Ider according to: U.S. Rare Earth Inc., And The Securities Exchange Commission, (2013).; 
Molycorp Inc., and United States Securities And Exchange Commission, (2014).; Statista, (2015).; Schuessler, 
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The estimated leverage power may deviate from the actual value because other materials add a 
certain value to the products as well. Nonetheless, without rare earths these goods could not 
provide the features they do, which reflects the strategic significance of REE’s for its end use. 
Products, which fall into one of the above stated application areas are summarized in the “End-
Markets”-column. It can be concluded that a significant demand is created by the consumer- and 
industrial-end-market. These sub-areas require rare earths firstly, according to the demand of the 
end product in the market and secondly, the advancements of research and development (R&D). 
As the historical analysis reveals, especially the latter point influences the demand in compli-
ance with the progress in R&D.  
In conclusion, the leverage power shows that the buyer has a strong susceptibility towards rare 
earths although the metals occupy a minimal part of the costs. 
 
3.1.4 Profit Margins 
 
As discovered in the previous paragraph, rare earths make up only a small percentage of the 
costs but have large leverage effects on the sales. According to Michael Porter, profitable buyers 
are less price sensitive if the purchased good represents a small percentage of their costs158.  
The price sensitivity refers in the first place to companies whose main business is to trade with 
rare earths (in the following: distributors). Therefore the profit margins have to be differentiated 
between those firms that chiefly work with REE’s and those who buy the metals as a component 
of a product159. Some end-user firms acquire rare earths directly from producer because of the 
nature of their products, which makes them equally susceptible towards price changes as in the 
case of distributors as Figure 7 shows. 
It can be therefore concluded, that rare earth trading companies are more price sensitive and 
therefore suffer faster from price changes because these firms function as a link between REE 
mining companies and downstream consumer. This also applies to firms that buy directly from 
producer.  
In contrast, firms with lower price sensitivity and potentially higher returns are those whose 
REE acquisition costs represent a fraction of the total expenditures. In addition, buyers with an 
efficient upstream organization will suffer less then others. This may be the chief reason for 
foreign firms to relocate their production to China, since that ensures a stable supply of rare 
earths associated with more favorable prices compared to the buyers that are not based in China. 
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3.1.5 Rare Earth Varieties 
 
This paragraph focuses on the types and varieties of rare earths that the buyer can purchase160. 
These characteristics provide information about the degree of standardization. If the market 
offers predominantly undifferentiated rare earths than the bargaining power of the buyer is sig-
nificantly greater while higher diversification results in a weakening161.  
The market evolution shows that increased R&D results in the isolation of individual rare 
earths, which subsequently leads to specialized and diversified applications.  
 
 
 
Main emphasis in this paragraph is placed on the last three stages, which clearly stress the dif-
ferent varieties of REE’s that are sold on the market. This circumstance is due to varying needs 
of industries that create the supply accordingly.  
The first segment “REOs to Market” serves customers that produce computers, catalytic con-
verters, TV displays, electronic chips, etc.162. Demand in the “Metals & Alloys to Market”-
segment is driven by the production of micro motors, sensors and further applications that re-
quire miniaturized components and strong magnetic features163. Customer of the third segment 
“Magnet to Market” produce light emitting diodes (LED’s), turbines, solar systems and other 
electronic products164. Each segment utilizes different types of the 17 available rare earths since 
each mineral provides different properties165.  
 
Summarized, diversified applications create the necessity for a larger variety of rare earths but 
the downside is a higher dependency on specialized supplier. Moreover, the demand is spread 
across several stages of the value chain. Therefore, the decentralized demand has detrimental 
effects for the buyer’s purchasing power.  
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161 Ibid. 
162 Molycorp Inc., and United States Securities And Exchange Commission, (2014). p.4 
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165 Ibid. p.5 
Figure 7 - The various stages of the rare earth production. Source: Molycorp Inc., The Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, (2010). 
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3.1.6 Switching Costs 
 
These types of costs occur when the buyer switch from one supplier to another166. A buyer 
would only change its supplier if a significant improvement in its own supply chain or the end 
product were expected. Buyers in the resource market normally align themselves to the prices 
offered by the industry, which is also applicable for rare earths. China is the prime supplier that 
dictates the prices and therefore switching costs are low. 
However, this conception does not take export quotas into consideration, which in the case of 
the rare earth market impacts the price- and supply-development. An external force that is rep-
resented by China’s rare earth quotations interrupts the market mechanism, in which supplier 
and buyer determine quantities and prices167. The historical analysis reveals that buyer purchase 
REE’s at any given price, which is chiefly due to the market constellation with China as the 
main supply source. 
Nonetheless, switching costs may also incur when companies aim to minimize rare earths in 
their products or purchase from sources that ensure environmentally friendlier and sustainable 
production and when seeking for substitutes168. One company that currently experiences switch-
ing costs is IBM169. Researchers are developing alternative components to replace rare earths in 
certain products. This undertaking is associated with following expenses170: 
 
1. Upfront investments 
2. Research, feasibility analysis  
3. Product redesign and testing 
4. New machines, tools  
5. Realignment of supply chain (incl. contract termination with existing supplier) 
6. Restructuring costs (incl. firing, hiring and retraining employees). 
 
Summarized, as discovered switching costs are particularly low in the rare earth market that 
subsequently tides the buyer to Chinese supplier. However, uncertain supplies in the past years 
associated with extreme volatile prices result in a rearrangement of supply chains in the buyer 
market, which will raise switching costs subsequently. 
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3.1.7 Backward Integration 
 
Buyer of rare earths may be qualified for backward integration, which represents the upstream 
movement towards the source of raw material171. Such strategic decision is associated with large 
investments for the acquisition of firms in order to extend the supply chain. Competitive bene-
fits may result in synergy effects such as cost reduction because human labor and equipment can 
be allocated more efficiently172. Companies that incorporate rare earths may additionally benefit 
from risk reductions of their own supply and lower price fluctuations. 
Yet, backward integration has its limitations for the buyers. As discovered in previous para-
graphs there are three types of buyer:  
 
1. Distributors: companies whose main purpose is the sales and distribution. They pur-
chase the REE’s straight from the mining companies 
2. End-user purchase directly from mining companies 
3. End-user purchase from distributors 
 
The purchase of an entire mining company as a backward integration measure seems to be not a 
feasible and realistic alternative because of enormous acquisition costs. According to Infinan-
cials.com Molycorp’s enterprise value (EV) is around US$ 1.5 billion173. In comparison the 
Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Co. Ltd. (REHT) has an enterprise value of 
almost US$ 14 billion174.  
With respect to all the buyer types, such acquisition is rather pointless considering the huge 
investments relative to their own company value. A more strategic sensible step for the buyers 
is the purchase of shares from rare earth supplying companies. That is financially and strategi-
cally more viable and leaves space for flexibility. Such backward integration is already consid-
ered by Japan and the US in the first place to ensure their supply175. This is particularly due to 
the concerns of China's rare earth policies.  
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3.2 The Supplier Power 
 
The supplier power in the rare earth market derives from its ability to exert influence on quality, 
quantity and prices, which is in direct linkage to the profitability of any participant in the indus-
try176. The factors taken into account to assess the level of supplier power will be as follows:  
 
3.2.1 The Supply Chain 
 
The analysis of the supplier side will firstly examine the structure of the supply chain and within 
this context illuminate its strength, weaknesses and arising opportunities. A series of stages are 
required until rare earths are ready to be used for any application. Figure 8 (p.36) reflects exem-
plary the various stages of the REE supply chain management (SCM), including the upstream- 
(extraction, processing) and the downstream industry (components, end-use).  
The supplier’s strongest power can be identified in the upstream operations that involve the 
“Extraction” and “Processing” of REE’s. This is also known as the initial step of the “Make-
Phase” in the supply chain management177. However, the exploration can be carried out any-
where because it’s mainly determined by the mining ore capacities as well as technological 
equipment. Mining only will not be a feasible strategy to increase competitiveness because the 
more critical part of the upstream operations, which adds significant value to the REE, is the 
processing178. 
The downstream operations in the supply chain comprise the “Components” and “End-Use 
Technology”. Moreover, they are further value adding processes that are dominated by Chinese 
manufacturer as well179. The downstream operations are in line with the demand side and can be 
reviewed in section 3.1.5. Rare Earth Varieties.  
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Summarized, the supply chain analysis identifies its strengths that potential mining activities 
can be done anywhere. The weakest points are the legal issues that limit the development of the 
entire supply chain and thus the expansion of the market position.  
 
3.2.2 Supplier Market Share 
 
At the present days over 90 percent of the exploration takes place in China, while other mining 
ores in the RoW contribute to a small extend, as displayed in Table 5 (p.37)180. However, it has 
to be taken into account that the demand for rare earths in China is to a certain extend due to 
foreign companies that produce there for export purposes. Therefore the 70 percent has to be 
classified according to its ultimate end-destination181.  
In addition it must be taken into account that the current market shares of foreign suppliers re-
main very low due to the uncertainty of investors that are associated with heavy pre-investments 
as stated in section 2.5. Interim Conclusion182. This comes together with the limited operations 
of foreign REE producer that suffer from a deficiency of vertical integration, which involves 
specifically the value adding downstream operations183.  
                                                      
180 Parthemore, C. (2011). p.8 
181 Unfortunately, no sufficient data has been found that subdivides China's REE demand. 
182 Humphries, M. (2013). p.14 
183 Humphries, M. (2013). p.14; Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). p.36 
Figure 8 – The various stages of the REE supply chain management associated with risks, opportunities and 
political directions. Source: Materials Research Society, (n.d.). 
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The analysis of the REE market 
evolution shows evidence that con-
tinues supply shortages along with 
high market prices incentivize for-
eign institutions to establish their 
own supplies. While high environ-
mental regulations and capital re-
quirements slow down and limit 
this process in the rest of the world, Chinese rare earth companies are state owned and thus ben-
efit strongly from their advantageous market situation184. This circumstance leads to following 
obstacle within the scope of market share reclamation: 
The additional risk for foreign REE producer and private investors arises from the potential 
threat that China may stimulate its domestic production and exports to such an extent that global 
market prices fall significantly. Prices below a certain threshold disable foreign companies to 
sustain a profitable business. This could jeopardize the market share of foreign REE companies 
and cause a financial disaster and a long-term loss of investor’s confidence. Although this sce-
nario is in contradiction to China's aim to motivate foreign institutions in the search for alterna-
tive supplier, it is up to the present day a feasible and realistic option taking China's market 
superiority into account185.  
Concluded, the market situation with a highly concentrated supplier side adds significant bar-
gaining power to Chinese supplier186. Therefore, foreign REE consumers show a stronger sus-
ceptibility to price, quality and quantity than Chinese buyer187. 
 
3.2.3 Supply Threats 
 
The supplier power of China will be additionally evaluated through an analysis of potential sup-
ply threats stressing the availability of certain REE’s, substitutions and regulatory compliances. 
Specifically the less abundant and more valuable HREE’s that are used for green technologies 
(wind energy, electric vehicles) are subject to higher risk due to their exceptional characteris-
tics188. Moreover these HREE’s (esp. Dysprosium amongst other less abundant REE’s) are ex-
pected to be in short supply in the next five to 10 years189.  
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 Supply (in %) Demand (in %) 
China 90 70 
RoW 10 30 
Table 5 – Summary of Supply and demand market share distribu-
tion. Source: Compiled by Kadir Ider, according to data from 
Humphries, M. (2013).; Molycorp Inc., The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, (2010) 
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Although China's industries will be affected as well, potential downside risks are limited since 
global REE supply and demand are located in China. According to the National Research Coun-
cil (NRC) there are no economic viable alternatives to rare earths that could replace them at the 
present days190. A more thorough analysis of substitutes is presented in section 3.4. Threat of 
Substitution. 
Furthermore the “Processing”, “Components” and “End-Use-Technology” threaten the supply 
of REE’s, as Figure 8 shows. At this stage the REE’s went through several critical refinement 
processes, at which large quantities of toxic and radioactive substances are released. The result-
ing consequences are major negative impacts on nature and all living beings191. The legal con-
straints associated with environmental requirements create the barrier for suppliers around the 
world to establish fully integrated up- and downstream processes192.  
This constitutes a dilemma for international producer, while the extraction can be carried out 
domestically, foreign companies may have to ship their rare earths to China for further pro-
cessing. Subsequently, the REE’s will be subject to China's REE export taxes (up to 27 percent) 
as soon as foreign companies reimport the metals193. Hence, the prices for rare earths offered by 
companies beyond China may exceed average market prices as well as cutting down profit mar-
gins significantly.  
 
To summarize, the lack of governmental actions, missing legal requirements and inefficient 
financial resources associated with the uncertainty of private investors causes predominantly a 
supply risk exposure for foreign firms. Considering the fact that it takes more than a decade to 
establish a secure end-to-end supply chain, it can be concluded that China's supplier hegemony 
will last at least in the medium term.  
 
3.2.4 Profit Margins 
 
Export restrictions, the high dependency on China's rare earth supply and the low production 
volumes in the RoW cause soaring prices, which temporarily increase profits for the supplier. 
After supply increases prices show a falling tendency to the marginal costs of production194. 
Apart from that, economic instabilities across the globe affect further price declines as a result 
of weaker demand, which affects the profits of rare earth companies in the same way195.  
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The price mechanism forces the expensive suppliers to leave the market while the more compet-
itive ones survive196. Since Chinese companies possess the majority of production and supply, 
they benefit from the economies of scale, highly competitive production costs and the govern-
ment support. Nonetheless, even Chinese producer are not exempt from the current market de-
velopments, as two of China's largest REE producer report massive drops in profits in 2014197. 
According to the Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech Co. Ltd. (REHT) profits 
plummeted by almost 60 percent while the operating revenue of China Minerals Rare Earth 
dropped 65 percent and incurred US$ 9 billion losses198. 
The largest foreign rare earth producer Molycorp experiences an even more precarious financial 
situation. The economic condition associated with recent price drops of 50 percent for most of 
the rare earths left the company with US$ 1.7 billion of liabilities. In 2011 the share price was at 
US$ 80 and fluctuates nowadays at US 0.48¢ per share, reflecting a market value of US$ 117 
million199. The effects of the price mechanism are reflected in a statement of Molycorp’s Chief 
Financial Officer200: 
 
“[...]“We have incurred and will continue to incur operating losses due to continuing softness in 
product pricing, inconsistent or depressed demand for our products, and the delayed ramp-up of 
operations at our Mountain Pass facility,” Mr. Doolan said. [...]” 
 
It can be concluded that the current economic situation affects the profits of rare earth producer 
dramatically. REE companies concentrate their operational activities on the manufacturing of 
these metals, while having co-products, such as steel. Nonetheless, the more profitable business 
with the REE’s is more susceptible to price and demand. This is because the REE’s represent a 
large fraction of the company's revenues201. This condition has disadvantageous effects on the 
bargaining power of supplier. 
However, comparing the profits respectively losses of Chinese and foreign REE companies, it 
can be concluded that the Chinese firms have a clear advantage, since they are state owned en-
terprises and thus will be backed by the government. 
                                                      
196 BusinessDictionary, (n.d.). 
197 Xinhua, (2015). Heavy metal losses for China's rare earth companies｜WantChinaTimes.com. 
[online] Wantchinatimes.com. Available at: http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id= 
20150405000063&cid=1202 [Accessed 18 May 2015]. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Koven, P. (2015). Molycorp Inc at risk of financial collapse, signalling fall of rare earth industry. 
[online] Financial Post. Available at: http://business.financialpost.com/news/mining/molycorp-inc-at-risk-
of-financial-collapse-signalling- fall-of-rare-earth-industry [Accessed 17 May 2015]. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Porter, M. (1998). p.25 
The Supplier Power  40 
 
 
3.2.5 Price Influence 
 
As discovered in the previous paragraphs the supply and demand is predominated by China. 
Therefore price influence on REE may be distinguished for China and for the RoW. Although 
China produces and consumes much of its own rare earth output, domestic quotas have been 
introduced within the scope of the industry consolidation202. As a result of stronger regulations, 
domestic prices increased203.  
Apart from that, China uses export quotas, resource taxation and impose embargoes in order to 
create supply shortages that subsequently affect higher prices abroad204. Foreign competitors 
share 10 percent of the supplier market share that puts them in an insufficient position to exert 
power on Chinese supplier and international buyer205. 
Hence, the influence of China on global prices is greater than its foreign competitors. It has to 
be taken into account that China's REE producers are more vulnerable as individual operating 
companies. But due to China's corporate governance structure, the state is the significant stake-
holder, which creates the appearance of “one big Chinese rare earth company”206.  
 
3.2.6 Concentration Of Export Destinations 
 
A drop of REE supply is due to the reduction in demand caused by the economic downturns207.  
US companies in the consumer electronics sector and the military are particularly affected by 
China's supply. In some cases US firms draw up to 100 percent on China208. The US receives 
around 10 percent of China's total exports209. Japan accounts for 20 percent that represents about 
80 percent of its entire REE consumption210.  
Both countries count for ⅓ of China’s exports, which reflects a high concentration of China’s 
export-destinations. The circumstance may give the impression that the bargaining power of 
foreign companies is increased. However, it has to be born in mind that China has the strongest 
influence in up- and downstream processes of the REE production.  
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In addition, its domestic demand is by far the largest worldwide, which ultimately increases its 
bargaining power relative to its foreign counterparts. It is therefore most likely that the world 
will depend on China's REE exports in the medium term while China maintains a strong bar-
gaining power.  
 
3.2.7 Switching Costs 
 
The analyses of the switching costs are in line with the buyer side. It has been illuminated that 
the predominant position of China tides many REE consumer to that particular source. There-
fore it can be concluded that China will not face switching costs. 
However, the current market condition generates potential switching costs for the “rest 10 per-
cent” of the supplier, which represent the foreign participants211. The two main factors that ac-
count for the suppliers switching costs are the highly competitive prices of China and the de-
mand. The previous chapters show in particular that this combination is an obstacle for foreign 
competitors. Although producer outside of China may be able to offer a diversified range of 
REE’s it does not provide them an advantage at the present days because China is able to offer 
REE’s in the same quality and larger quantities. Thus it affects as well the switching costs, 
which leads to the conclusion that the bargaining power of foreign supplier is too small for both, 
to compete with Chinese supplier and to exert bargaining power on the buyer212.  
 
3.2.8 Forward Integration 
 
A forward integration is associated with the extension of operations into downstream processes, 
as displayed in Figure 8 (p.36). Such move requires resources, necessary skills and know-how 
and the volume to ensure the decisive factors for competitive operations213. One major benefit 
for rare earth producer is the realization of synergy effects including the increased allocation 
efficiency for resources (labor, equipment, finance), ensuring quality and quantity and thus in-
crease competitiveness214. This strategic measure can be recognized by China's attempt to ex-
tend its value chain through the integration of downstream processes. As the previous sections 
reveal, there are indicators that China uses its market supremacy, quotation system and low 
production costs in order to attract foreign companies to relocate to China215.  
 
                                                      
211 Porter, M. (1998). p.28 
212 Ibid. 
213 Krajewski, L., Ritzman, L. and Malhotra, M. (2007). p.401. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Morrison, W.M.; Tang, R. (2012). p18 
The Supplier Power  42 
 
 
This statement is strengthened by the policies of the National Development and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC). Foreign companies that operate in China have to comply with following terms 
and conditions216: 
 
1. Foreigners are prohibited to operate in the REE mining  
2. Foreigners may be eligible for processing (smelting, separation) but only with a Chinese partner 
3. Foreigners should invest into downstream operations to develop new REE applications (which 
have to be patented first in China and be shared with Chinese partners217) 
 
Many Japanese and US corporations have already moved their production to China in return for 
stable, sustainable and low-cost supply of rare earths218. Moreover, China is building partner-
ships with foreign REE producer, including Australian based Lynas Corp. that is one of the 
world’s largest REE producers outside of China219. Although this step represents a horizontal 
integration it is stated here because this strategic implementation aims to secure China’s down-
stream operations. 
 
To sum up, China uses its position to expand its vertical operations. Foreign producer see 
themselves often in the situation of establishing cooperation’s with Chinese firms to access the 
resource under favorable conditions. However, in return they have to give up their independen-
cy and disclose patents.  
 
In summary of the supplier side it becomes clear that not only buyer but also supplier beyond 
Chinese border are exposed to China's bargaining power. One potential strategy is the estab-
lishment of partnerships around the world, share production processes and costs. This would 
enhance the competitiveness of foreign REE producer and decrease the dependency on Chinese 
supply. Both, Chinese and foreign supplier have potentials for further forward integration. Chi-
na takes the lead in the global comparison not least because its dominant position. Therefore 
Chinese supplier can exert pressure on its smaller rivals as well as its customer. 
The evaluation of the eight factors above is reflected in the statement of Mr. Karl Gschneidner 
that gets it right to the point: China, still the biggest miner. “[There are] lot’s of companies 
worldwide, [however, they have] not much power”220. 
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3.3 Potential Entrants 
 
The desire to enter the rare earth market is essentially to gain access to the resource and sustain-
able supply221. The assessment of the barrier characteristics will provide indicators for the entry 
conditions and further the factors to a successful entry.  
Figure 9 below reflects the stages of the supply chain associated with the market entrance diffi-
culty level. It is not associated with a specific country but rather with the entire REE market. 
The evaluation is divided into four subsections and carried out as follows: 
 
3.3.1 Market Concentration And Opacity 
 
At the present days the mar-
ket concentration is on a 
high level due to China's 
hegemony, as reflected in 
Figure 9. Thus China pos-
sesses the absolute ad-
vantage in terms of econo-
mies of scale. Adam Smith 
best describes this that the 
production of large quanti-
ties enables an efficient allo-
cation of resources. Subse-
quently this impacts the 
development of more specif-
ic machines that meet the various needs of the industry222. Given the current market structure, 
foreign firms can enter the market with large quantities and risking a backlash from China or 
small volumes and realize an overall cost handicap223. As discovered previously, economies of 
scale may be created by partnerships with strategic focus on the sharing of intangible assets224. 
Sharing brand names, know-how (including patents) enables foreign companies to realize econ-
omies of scale.  
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Figure 9 – Market entrance characteristics associated with the entry diffi-
culty levels. Source: Chart compiled by Kadir Ider according to data col-
lection of rare earths in U.S. Department of Energy, (2011). 
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Intangible assets do not require storage or transportation and costs may incur once when the 
asset is created and for the acquisition of the rights of use225. Because this reflects a relatively 
better opportunity for market entrance therefore the market opacity is slightly above a moderate 
level. However, it will be hard for foreign firms to attain economies of scale in the near future 
because China is investing heavily into the REE sector since the 1970’s226.  
The advanced learning curve of Chinese manufacturer has a positive effect on declining unit 
costs and an accumulation of experience227. This reflects an additional problem for foreign insti-
tutions. Although the largest producer outside of China, such as Molycorp and Lynas possess 
advanced technologies, they cannot realize economies of scale if their production volumes are 
not competitive with Chinese firms.  
 
3.3.2 Capital Requirements 
 
A major entrance barrier is associated with capital requirements since it impacts all areas of the 
operations. Considering the mere value of rare earths of around US$ 3 billion, capital costs of 
up to US$ 1 billion represent a risky undertaking for investors228. Sufficient financial resources 
are particularly important for the junior miners because they are often underfunded, which is a 
principal reason for Mr. Gschneidner’s forecast about the downfall of the majority of REE pro-
ducer229.  
There is a higher chance that the large rare earth producer will survive because of their ability to 
better allocate financial resources and thus diversify into several production processes230. Since 
the mere REE mining is at the lower end of the value creation, large producer rather prefer to 
shift their operations to the more lucrative processes.  
Secondly, the exploitation process of each mine is unique and cannot be implemented in other 
mines since each deposit has different natural characteristics231. Low prospects for high profits 
associated with extensive capital costs make the market entry more difficult. Figure 9 reflects 
the aggravated market entry conditions that are associated with the necessary capital require-
ments. Almost each process of the supply chain involves moderate to high capital investments. 
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3.3.3 Regulatory Requirements 
 
Legal requirements represent a particularly sensitive entry barrier for potential REE producer 
because national and international regulations have a direct impact on the operations. One spe-
cific example that represents such governmental impacts is the light bulb industry, in which 
domestic legislative measures of the US impacted the entire industry dramatically232.  
From this date on Compact Fluorescent Light bulbs (CFL) were not allowed to trade on the 
market, thus virtually eliminating the supply and demand for fluorescence. In return the supply 
and demand for the so-called Triband Phosphors (used for LED’s) increased233. This affected 
the rare earths in the same way since they are an integral part of replacement substance. There-
fore it can be concluded that governments should reform the legal basis in order to support the 
market entrance.  
According to the interview with Mr. Gschneidner, such regulatory changes can be executed on 
federal, state and local level and may include loan guarantees, tax incentives and the support of 
the vertical integration beyond the mining of rare earths234. Especially these steps reflect a sig-
nificant market entrance difficulty as displayed in Figure 9.  
 
3.3.4 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
 
A possible roadblock for the market entrance is the ownership of strategic patents, represented 
in Figure 9 as “Knowledge/Technical Requirements”. The IPR’s involve human capital as well 
as technical expertise in the various stages of the supply chain235. The R&D enables various 
industries to utilize new rare earths for further applications. As a consequence, more experts and 
further developed equipment will be needed in order to sustain the supply of REE’s236. This is 
because education and training leads to the development of new technologies that subsequently 
contribute to the creation of new patents for the REE production237.  
“Knowledge/Technical Requirements” in Figure 9 is associated with the separation, metal mak-
ing, alloying and magnet manufacturing, which represent the highest entry barrier. Specifically 
these steps require perhaps the most significant IPR’s for the permanent magnet (NdFeB) manu-
facturing238. 
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These particular stages create most of the value and therefore are associated with higher profits 
as discovered in the supplier side analysis. At the present days the Japanese company Hitachi 
owns more than 600 patents for the manufacturing of NdFeB magnets239. Five licensees are in 
China, three in Japan and two in Germany while the US has no licenses240. This is a disad-
vantage for US rare earth corporations taking into account that the US is the second largest rare 
earth consumer worldwide. 
Mr. Gschneidner states in the interview that IPR’s are one of the main problems that cause the 
REE market crisis in the RoW241. This is due to the fact that irrespective of the production loca-
tion, the ownership of IPR’s allows to keep the control of certain value chain processes, despite 
the hegemony of China in the rare earth market242. Nevertheless, China’s highly competitive 
production costs act as a countervailing force to the IPR’s of foreign companies. 
 
Summarized, the potential entrants have to cope with several properties of the entry barriers. 
Firstly, the availability of liquid assets and government actions lead to an increased efficiency of 
economies of scale and the development of new intellectual property rights. Secondly, China's 
influence on the prices will affect the market entry since existing and expected entry deterring 
price will increase the threat of market entrance243. This condition will remain as long as foreign 
competitors have not accumulated the necessary expertise244.  
This problem can be resolved through tighter cooperation of foreign companies that could be 
the solution for the short-term with possibly positive long-term effects. According to Mr. 
Gschneidner “There are lots of junior miners - worldwide several hundred, but maybe only ten 
will make it”245. This will become a self fulfilling prophecy if potential entrants will not succeed 
in entering the REE market and become serious competitors. 
 
3.4 Threat Of Substitution 
 
This section analyses the feasibility of potential substitutes and within this context presents a 
selected range of affected industries246. The assessment emphasizes the development, improve-
ment and redesign of alternative materials and systems that achieve equal or superior properties 
to eliminate the need of rare earths while retaining the functionality and cost efficiency.  
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The assessment is limited to six key industries with high earning potentials that suffer mostly 
from rare earth shortages247. The represented selection includes magnets, motors, generators, 
photovoltaic, batteries and phosphors248. In addition, the rare earth recycling will be considered 
as well although it may not be a substitute in the traditional way but it represents an alternative 
supply channel. 
 
3.4.1 Substitutability Through Materials And Systems 
 
At the present days substitutions for permanent magnets are researched particularly since they 
affect several key industries worldwide249. According to Mr. Gschneidner there are currently no 
marketable substitutes that replace any rare earths250.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) in cooperation with the Ames Laboratory 
(under the leadership of Mr. Gschneidner) reported a breakthrough in the research of a substi-
tute for Dysprosium251. This rare earth is known to be the scarcest and one of the most expen-
sive amongst its peers. Partially because the supply is below its demand, hence putting upward 
pressure on prices252. This metal is used for the magnets for green technologies. Ultimately hy-
brid cars, generators, wind turbines will benefit from this alternative material253. However, the 
substitute for the Dysprosium, the so-called Cerium is a rare earth itself. The two advantageous 
over the other REE’s are its abundance and the production is known to be less burdensome254. 
Therefore it can be produced much easier elsewhere and does not depend highly on China. 
Additionally, the Nanotechnology is considered as a potential substitute255. These materials 
function on a nanometer scale that can provide superior performance compared to rare earths. 
However, from an economic standpoint, it has not reached a commercial feasibility to produce 
this alternative and it may take several years to make it market ready.  
The third option that may completely replace rare earths is Graphene, which can provide signif-
icantly higher performances than rare earths. This material has the potential to impact and trans-
form more industries and has higher commercial leverage power than REE’s.  
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Despite the potential wide range applications of Graphene, only a few companies worldwide 
have access to this mineral256. About 70 percent of the global supply of Graphene is controlled 
by China and 25 percent by the US257. China has already implemented export charges of 20 
percent and value added tax (VAT) of 17 percent258. Prices for Graphene increased between 
2006 and 2013 already more than 100 percent due to steadily rising demand and further techno-
logical innovations.  
The commodity supercycle follows a similar trend as the REE’s with one exception: China al-
ready introduced export restrictions in the early stage of the Graphene life cycle, whereas the 
quotas for REE’s came 15 years after China achieved its supply hegemony. While these actions 
force up prices for Graphene, foreign countries take advantage of that and aim for a faster mar-
ket entrance259. 
 
3.4.2 REE Recycling 
 
An increase in recycling results in a demand decrease for newly produced rare earths and thus 
minimizes the dependency on China. Particularly large scaled magnets are currently in the main 
focus of REE recycling companies since they are larger and easier to extract from the metal 
scrap260. 
Japan develops the “urban mining” in other words recovering metals from used electronic de-
vices, e.g. laptops, smartphones and batteries261. The country is even importing electronic scrap 
in order to boost this plan. It is estimated that 300.000 tons of REE’s are available in used elec-
tronics, with a rising tendency. However, less than 1 percent is recycled at the present days due 
to insufficiently established infrastructures that support the recycling process262.  
Major challenges that these companies are facing include the development of automated tech-
nologies and processes to ensure an economically viable and environmentally friendly recovery. 
Furthermore, innovative product redesigns could support the easier access and thus the extrac-
tion of rare earth components, which encourages the recycling process additionally263.  
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The various stages of the REE supply chain management (Figure 8, p.36) reflect the recycling 
cycle of REE’s. Rare earth recovery through recycling goes through the same stages as the re-
covery through mining. The major difference is that the recycling process involves already 
mined and processed REE’s.  
Although this minimizes the environmental degradation significantly, 30 percent of the recycled 
rare earths are lost in this process due to insufficient systems and machines264. While this reduc-
es the actual recovery rate, it has also major effects on the productivity and profitability and thus 
the economic competitiveness of recycling with alternative REE productions265.  
 
Summarized, if one substitute establishes itself in the market it will subsequently limit the po-
tential threats of China. REE consumer would have to bear one-time switching costs but in re-
turn detach from China's supply. However, market prices for rare earths could be sealed tempo-
rarily because China possesses high competitiveness and a well-developed workforce266.  
That already incentivized the Chinese to enter the (Graphene) substitute market with a strategy 
as it already implemented for the REE’s. Many sources advice to reduce the usage of REE’s but 
such a measure does not break the dependence on rare earths.  
A simple substitution of rare earths is very difficult due to the complex technologies nowadays. 
Therefore experts advise to seek for functional substitutions, where new technology completely 
replaces another one, while avoiding the usage of rare earths267.  
The major challenge will be to identify viable substitutes, required technologies and infrastruc-
tures that contribute to a decentralized control of strategic commodities. As Mr. Gschneidner 
comments on this: “A lot work is going on but only some substitutes may be successful”268.  
 
3.5 The Competitive Rivalry 
 
Despite the reduced industry growth at the present days, it is expected that REE demand will 
increase on average by 10 percent annually in the next five years269. This motivates producer 
beyond China to establish independent respectively alternative supplies. Such undertaking is 
associated with high requirements, i.a. government actions and financial funding’s that could 
boost the competitiveness of firms in the rest of the world.  
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In addition, the analysis of the previous chapters reveals an unequally balanced supply and de-
mand associated with a poor diversification amongst competitors, a difficult situation for poten-
tial entrants and substitutions that are currently in the development phase. Furthermore, as a 
consequence to the lacking differentiation there are virtually no switching costs for the buyer 
but exist chiefly for foreign supplier. The circumstance puts pressure and limits the operation 
capabilities of market participants in the RoW. 
These factors are in direct linkage with China's predominant market position and the prices for 
rare earths that determine whether foreign producer operate feasible or not. A sudden surge of 
cheap Chinese REE supplies may cause market prices to fall below the threshold, thus disabling 
foreign companies to compete on the market profitably. The stimulus threshold cannot be de-
termined at this point because it is different for every country since it depends on several input 
factors including labor, capital and the quantitative availability of rare earths. Moreover, China's 
large price influence reflects a permanent potential risk exposure that additionally adds to its 
competitive market position.  
China's supremacy associated with government control, inflow of large investments and well-
developed infrastructures in the rare earth market enables the country to dominate strategic val-
ue chains. This creates a high entry as well as exit barrier, which put China in the position to 
realize higher profits relative to its smaller foreign competitors270. While this situation is benefi-
cial for China it is associated with an increased risk exposure for both, foreign buyer and suppli-
er. The sum of all individual aspects creates in addition a psychological entry barrier due to the 
uncertainty of foreign market participants.  
A major hurdle that affects all miners worldwide is the processing of rare earths. The extraction 
process has to be applied to all REE’s irrespective of their market value while the chance exists 
that each production might not provide higher valued metals.  
This circumstance creates a reverse economy of scale because the more producers mine the 
higher the chance of unprofitable results271. The possession of several mines, diversified and 
specialized manufacturing, low production costs associated with a large market share enables 
China to overcome this hurdle better than its foreign competitors. 
A ray of hope for foreign companies is the maturing industry that entails declining growth rates, 
smaller profits that eventually increase the rivalry over the long-term272. The current market 
development may be considered as an inflection point where disruptions create new opportuni-
ties for competitors to become an equal counterforce in the market.  
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3.6 The Competitive Strategy 
 
The purpose of this 
chapter is to present a 
framework for foreign 
rare earth market par-
ticipants to compete 
against China's leader-
ship. An implementa-
tion of the external 
benchmarking with the 
airline industry takes 
place because of the 
similar market struc-
ture. In this comparison the foreign REE producer are compared with the airlines in the aviation 
industry as stated in Figure 10. The Input factors indicate the upstream- and the output factors 
the downstream market. The arrow pointing to the top right reflects the desired market condi-
tion. Box B represents the greatest chances to make high profits due to the combination of a 
highly competitive input market and a monopolistic output market. This condition offers high 
bargaining power since the firm has a large choice of input factors while it is the principal seller 
in the market where it can determine the price. 
Examining the REE market from the perspective of the RoW it can be concluded that it faces a 
quasi-monopoly led by China in the input market, which comprises the acquisition of labor, 
REE’s and capital273. Many firms, ranging from steel, green-tech to high-tech applications, 
dominate the output market, where firms are selling REE containing products. A quasi-
monopolistic input market associated with a competitive output market locates the international 
producer in the center of box C. 
The input factors of the airline industry are airplanes, landing rights and pilots. Both, Airbus and 
Boeing are the two major aircraft producer representing an oligopolistic structure. Most cities 
have one airport, forcing the airlines to accept the airports terms of condition in order to operate 
there. Pilots are difficult to replace due to their special education. In addition they are expensive 
and unionized, therefore reflecting a quasi-monopoly of labor supply274. The output market is 
characterized by a large group of ticket seller represented by travel agencies and the Internet. 
                                                      
273 Begg, D. and Ward, D. (2009). pp.118-119 
274 Ibid. 
Figure 10 - The input and output market of REE’s (blue circle) and the airline 
industry (orange circle) in comparison.  Source: Figure by Kadir Ider accord-
ing to Begg, D. and Ward, D. (2009). 
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Customers choose the airline according to the cheapest ticket offered for the given travel dates 
between two cities275. The output market indicates high competition, which positions the airline 
industry as well in box C.  
The strategic steps that airlines take to enhance their competitiveness in the market is to engage 
in alliances, which allows them to realize the Code Sharing that involves to share passengers276. 
Subsequently the competition in the output market is reduced and moves the airlines towards 
the desired box B. Furthermore, the airlines exchange landing rights, share the pilot and crew 
trainings as well as place joint airplane orders in order to realize bulk discounts. This measure 
increases the bargaining power of airlines and gives them some control over the input prices, 
thus shifting the airlines further towards box B277. 
The second competitive situation is amongst short- and long-distance airlines. Short-distance 
operators fly point-to-point between specific routes that others do not serve. Therefore these 
airlines have a higher profitability since they are often the only ones flying between certain des-
tinations, thus creating a monopoly supply. In contrast, the long-distance operators are less prof-
itable because of several others that serve the same route.  
This increases the price competition because the buyers tend to select the one with the best pric-
es278. Therefore these airlines take advantage of the hub-and-spoke strategy. Long-distance air-
lines share their passengers and thus are able to fill the planes more efficiently279.  
The lessons learned from the aviation industry can be applied straightforward to the REE mar-
ket. In other words, foreign rare earth producer aim for box B as displayed in Figure 10. In order 
to recapture the necessary value chains, foreign companies should implement the code-sharing 
operations. The aim should be to develop the vertical integration with main focus on the down-
stream operations280. As discovered, the mining operations reflect the very beginning of the 
entire value chain process. The processes afterwards are associated with very advanced technol-
ogies to create the needed property of each rare earth281.  
Code Sharing would involve the sharing of production facilities, labor and patents. This could 
be realized amongst REE companies around the globe and is not limited to a specific location, 
thus enhancing each firm's capacities and possibilities. Sharing these input factors minimizes the 
limitations of one company by utilizing the resources of the other partner. 
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Taking David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage into account, each REE producing 
partner may specialize into that specific area with the most efficient output282. This strategy 
lowers costs, which has positive effects on the prices that foreign firms can offer for their rare 
earths.  
The revenues are determined by the price a company offers for its products while the costs are a 
result of labor-, capital- and raw material prices283. This enables the costs reduction on the one 
hand and incentivizes closer cooperation due to the mutual interactions on the other hand. 
Moreover, by appearing as one alliance they influence the market structure and therefore the 
prices for rare earths. Thus foreign firms can realize economies of scope, hence moving them 
closer towards box B.  
The establishment of a competitive strategy requires actions on international government and 
corporate level. The agreement on common goals should involve the synchronization of inter-
governmental trade arrangements, including import and export relieves as well as raw material 
policies. Ultimately, the coordination of resources is necessary to create a positive sum game284.  
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3.7 Economic Consequences Until 2025 
 
According to a McKinsey report from 2013, technological innovations have experienced a rapid 
development in the past 3 decades285. With further innovations the industries will be able to 
diversify their product lines and services. In 2025 it is predicted that the global GDP related to 
the “Internet of Things” will be affected by US$ 36 trillion286.  
The vast growing high-tech industry is reflected in the sales figures of smartphones and tablets 
that have already increased 7 times within the past years287. Nevertheless, the mobile computing 
devices represent a fractional amount of technologies that utilize the potentials of REE’s.  
A shortage of these elements will affect economies, enterprises and consumer from several per-
spectives. Those interest groups depend on technologies on the daily basis at the workplace and 
in their private life. Cutting off the supply of critical elements in technologies will disable the 
innovation process and production of new technologies and the related services. Specifically 
Japan and the US will experience major impacts, since they count amongst the largest econo-
mies globally and consume most of China's REE exports288.  
They have a vast interest to invest and further ensure the supply of rare earth metals. Therefore a 
mitigation of the US’s and Japan’s economy may have disruptive consequences on the global 
scale. The rare earth elements are key components in nowadays and future innovations. Ranging 
from the high-tech industry to the green-technologies, all industries are predicted to increase and 
contribute significantly to the GDP and thus to the wealth of nations289. The shift towards the 
usage of more REE depending products may result in sales growth but the downside is the in-
creasing need for rare earths.  
The scenarios analyzed in the McKinsey report match with the predictions of Mr. Gschneidner, 
that particularly the downstream REE consumption will grow on average 10 percent annually290. 
If China continues to determine market prices in the long run, foreign corporations will face a 
difficult periods to establish feasible supply chains and to meet their own demand. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined China's rare earth strategy and the impact on its own market position as 
well as on foreign institutions. The historical analysis reveals China's competitive strength that 
is associated with low environmental regulations, government substitutions, low labor costs and 
a concentration of rare earths. Higher requirements and production costs elsewhere enable 
thereby China to expand its market leadership in the supply and demand. The implementation of 
Hotelling's Theory shows that a pure examination of quantitative metrics distorts the outcome of 
the market evaluation.  
Moreover, the five forces analysis uncovers the qualitative characteristics that shape the con-
temporary market structure. The analysis shows clearly that the price mechanism is the decisive 
lever for other market factors. Specifically, the stimulus threshold is mostly significant that ei-
ther encourages or discourages the expansion of activities in the REE market. Besides the price, 
it is the uncertainty about China's potential actions that could lead to repeated supply shortages 
in several key industries. This circumstance stimulates alternative and innovative supply ap-
proaches in the market as well. Nevertheless, the price as a market-influencing factor is consid-
ered as the top parameter. 
China possesses up to the present days the strongest price influence and the power to cause far-
reaching effects on multiple industries. Therefore it can be concluded that the evidence found in 
the analysis of the market forces strengthen the affirmation of the thesis question.  
China's motivation for its strategic realignment is firstly the consolidation of its REE sector that 
will be controlled by a few large state-owned enterprises in order to combat illegal mining and 
unauthorized exports291. Secondly, the stronger concentration on its domestic market growth 
leads additionally to the slowdown of the mining activities in order to ensure a sustainable do-
mestic supply and adequate prices. These measures may be considered as part of China's eco-
nomic transformation process. The economy of China went through decades of double-digit 
growth and now is expected to level off at around 7.3 percent292.  
In fact, Japan and South Korea went through such economic development until they eventually 
established themselves293. Nonetheless, due to the decade-long dependence on China's supply, 
the sudden reorientation has deleterious consequences particularly for foreign buyers.  
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Therefore it can be acknowledged that China's rare earth policies are strategic improvement 
measures for its domestic sector, yet at the same time disrupts global supply.  
The rest of the world realizes that a sustainable supply cannot function through the reliance on 
one source. Therefore foreign companies focus specifically on the expansion of downstream 
REE operations. As it has been discovered, the mining itself will not ensure the supply but ra-
ther the more strategic and value adding steps including the processing and components produc-
tion are significant.  
The current economic-political condition is insufficient to improve the market environment, 
which creates a long lead-time that is associated with high capital expenditures. Moreover, pri-
marily high market prices stimulate alternative supply approaches. In order to establish competi-
tive operations, foreign firms have to overcome this mechanism because the REE prices do not 
remain at a high level as the analysis shows.  
 
Summarized, China's strategic refocus impacts global prices and supply of rare earths. This 
incentivizes institutions with strategic interests in these metals to take advantage of the contem-
porary market situation. Their chief reason is to ensure steady supply and solid prices for cur-
rent and future demand. The analysis of the thesis concludes that the question “Does China’s 
rare earth strategy disrupt its quasi-monopoly and thereby stimulate innovative supply 
approaches in the global rare earth market?” is logically consistent and can be admitted as 
correct. 
 
Certainly, all attempts to detach from China's supply hegemony open up new opportunities. 
Deeply interesting remains how foreign institutions will ultimately solve the situation. 
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6.1 Rare Earths Statistics 
 
Year Unit value ($/t) 
World 
production 
(in t) 
Price change 
relative to 
previous 
year*1 
Mean 
Mean 
excluding 
outlier 
Output 
relative to 
previous year 
Mean 
1950 3540 470   
32.32 3.11 
  
25.24 
1951 1670 1240 -53 164 
1952 3910 1820 134 47 
1953 7090 3960 81 118 
1954 8630 7840 22 98 
1955 6720 5760 -22 -27 
1956 5070 5230 -25 -9 
1957 1920 5980 -62 14 
1958 5100 8060 166 35 
1959 5050 2810 -1 -65 
1960 3540 2270 -30 -19 
1961 82 3690 -98 63 
1962 341 8020 316 117 
1963 319 6060 -6 -24 
1964 385 3680 21 -39 
1965 485 6960 26 89 
1966 284 16200 -41 133 
1967 562 16900 98 4 
1968 401 16200 -29 -4 
1969 420 18100 5 12 
1970 412 15900 -2 -12 
1971 1040 16400 152 3 
1972 3690 18200 255 11 
1973 2150 24000 -42 32 
1974 3070 25600 43 7 
1975 2050 22100 -33 -14 
1976 4380 19700 114 -11 
1977 2600 24500 -41 24 
1978 2500 26500 -4 8 
1979 4580 28800 83 9 
1980 1960 27300 -57 -5 
1981 1870 30600 -5 
13.26 3.22 
12 
7.31 
1982 2360 26600 26 -13 
1983 2820 31400 19 18 
1984 2380 41400 -16 32 
1985 2190 43500 -8 5 
1986 3840 39900 75 -8 
1987 3970 46900 3 18 
1988 2230 55300 -44 18 
1989 6780 60700 204 10 
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1990 8990 52900 33 -13 
1991 9470 41700 5 -21 
1992 10100 50100 7 20 
1993 9010 46700 -11 -7 
1994 7980 55100 -11 18 
1995 8210 74300 3 35 
1996 7150 79700 -13 7 
1997 8540 68300 19 -14 
1998 8900 77100 4 13 
1999 6400 86600 -28 12 
2000 6450 90900 1 5 
2001 5790 94500 -10 
35.99 8.43 
4 
1.94 
2002 7500 98200 30 4 
2003 6150 97100 -18 -1 
2004 8590 102000 40 5 
2005 6595 122000 -23 20 
2006 3890 137000 -41 12 
2007 5290 124000 36 -9 
2008 13600 132000 157 6 
2009 9300 135000 -32 2 
2010 20000 126000 115 -7 
2011 58100 113000 191 -10 
2012 51200 110000 -12 -3 
Average in % 26.88 24.62 4.92 14.95 4.63 
*1 Bold values in this column are the statistical outlier. Results are stated in “Mean excluding outlier”. 
 
Formula for the calculation of the “Output relative to previous year”: 
 T = unit value of actual year 
Tn-1 = unit value of previous year  
  K = relativ change to the previous year 
 
Formula for the calculation of the “Price change relative to previous year”:  
           P = price of actual year 
           Pn-1 = price of previous year 
                         PR = relativ price change to the previous year 
 
Formula for the mean: 
          KM = Mean (Average) 
 
Note: 
• This statistic is used for Figure 3 (p.10), Figure 4 (p.13), Table 1 (p.11). 
 
Source: 
 
U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Rare earth statistics, in Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., comps., Historical 
statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States (2012 version): U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey Data Series 140. [online] Available at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ histori-
cal-statistics/. [Accessed 15 April 2015]. 
Pn-1 / P = PR 
(K1 + K2 +…+ Kn) / n = KM 
Tn-1 / T = K 
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6.2 Iron And Steel Statistics 
 
  Iron Steel 
Year 
Unit value   
($/t) 
World production 
in million tons 
Unit value 
($/t) 
World production 
in million tons 
1945 24.30 72.0 10.20 101 
1946 27.00 72.0 11.10 123 
1947 33.40 91.0 13.00 123 
1948 41.00 103 14.90 141 
1949 46.40 105 16.10 145 
1950 47.20 134 17.00 189 
1951 51.50 151 18.30 211 
1952 53.40 153 18.70 211 
1953 54.90 169 20.20 235 
1954 55.00 159 21.10 224 
1955 55.90 193 22.10 269 
1956 59.10 201 24.00 284 
1957 64.40 212 26.30 293 
1958 65.70 197 27.20 271 
1959 65.40 224 27.60 305 
1960 65.60 259 27.60 346 
1961 64.50 256 27.50 352 
1962 64.10 266 27.40 361 
1963 64.50 281 27.60 387 
1964 64.20 317 27.80 437 
1965 62.80 335 27.90 459 
1966 62.10 347 28.30 475 
1967 62.20 350 28.60 494 
1968 62.20 379 29.30 530 
1969 71.60 411 30.70 574 
1970 71.60 431 32.70 594 
1971 77.40 430 35.20 581 
1972 85.30 454 37.30 629 
1973 82.00 501 38.40 698 
1974 143 512 48.60 708 
1975 189 479 56.40 644 
1976 198 498 60.00 674 
1977 199 488 65.80 673 
1978 205 506 72.80 715 
1979 212 532 80.20 745 
1980 217 514 86.60 716 
1981 227 502 96.60 707 
1982 230 457 100 644 
1983 226 463 101 663 
1984 215 495 105 711 
1985 223 499 105 718 
1986 207 495 99.80 713 
1987 209 509 102 734 
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1988 235 539 111 780 
1989 NA 546 115 784 
1990 NA 531 112 771 
1991 NA 509 110 737 
1992 NA 503 106 724 
1993 NA 507 108 730 
1994 NA 516 113 730 
1995 NA 536 120 752 
1996 NA 516 116 751 
1997 NA 540 116 797 
1998 NA 535 114 770 
1999 NA 539 105 784 
2000 NA 573 108 850 
2001 NA 585 101 852 
2002 NA 608 105 907 
2003 NA 673 110 974 
2004 NA 720 147 1060 
2005 NA 802 160 1140 
2006 NA 881 174 1250 
2007 NA 956 183 1350 
2008 NA 931 221 1330 
2009 NA 919 165 1230 
2010 NA 1030 192 1430 
2011 NA 1100 216 1520 
2012 NA 1110 208 1550 
 
Note: 
• This statistic is primarily used for the visualization of Figure 3 (p.10). 
 
Source: 
 
U.S. Geological Survey, (2014), Iron and steel statistics, in DiFrancesco, C.A., Kelly, T.D., Bleiwas, 
D.I., and Fenton, M.D., comps., Historical statistics for mineral and material commodities in the 
United States (2012 version): U.S. Geological Survey Data Series 140. [online] Available at: 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/ minerals/pubs/historical-statistics/. [Accessed 15 April 2015] 
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6.3 US Three Month Treasury Bills Interest Rate (Secondary Market) 
 
Year 
US three month 
treasury bills 
interest rate 
Mean 
1954 0.94 
4.48 
1955 1.72 
1956 2.62 
1957 3.22 
1958 1.77 
1959 3.39 
1960 2.87 
1961 2.35 
1962 2.77 
1963 3.16 
1964 3.55 
1965 3.95 
1966 4.86 
1967 4.29 
1968 5.34 
1969 6.67 
1970 6.39 
1971 4.33 
1972 4.06 
1973 7.04 
1974 7.85 
1975 5.79 
1976 4.98 
1977 5.26 
1978 7.18 
1979 10.05 
1980 11.39 
1981 14.04 
6.56 1982 10.6 
1983 8.62 
1984 9.54 
1985 7.47 
1986 5.97 
1987 5.78 
1988 6.67 
1989 8.11 
1990 7.5 
1991 5.38 
1992 3.43 
1993 3 
1994 4.25 
1995 5.49 
1996 5.01 
1997 5.06 
1998 4.78 
1999 4.64 
2000 5.82 
2001 3.4 
1.54 
2002 1.61 
2003 1.01 
2004 1.37 
2005 3.15 
2006 4.73 
2007 4.36 
2008 1.37 
2009 0.15 
2010 0.14 
2011 0.05 
2012 0.09 
2013 0.06 
2014 0.03 
Average in % 4.19 
 
Note: 
• Values of the secondary market are chosen, because of the extensive availability of data. 
• This statistic is primarily used for the scenario modeling in 2.4 Hotelling’s Theory Of Non-
Renewable Resources (pp.22-24). 
 
Source: 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (2013), Selected Interest Rates (Daily) - H.15. Board of Govern-
ance of the Federal Reserve, in Treasury bills (secondary market) - annual rates. [online] Available 
at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm#to [Accessed 5 May 2015]. 
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6.4 Market Entrance Characteristics And Entry Level Difficulty 
 
 
Mining/ Milling/ 
Concentration 
Separation 
(Oxides) 
Metal 
Making 
Alloying/ 
Powder 
Production 
Magnet 
Manufacturing 
Motors and 
Generators 
Market 
Concentration  Moderate to High 
Moderate to 
High High High High Moderate 
Market Opacity High High Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Capital 
Requirements  Moderate to High High 
Moderate 
to High 
Moderate to 
High 
Moderate to 
High 
Low to 
Moderate 
Knowledge/ 
Technical 
Requirements  
Low to Moderate High High High High Moderate 
Regulatory/ 
Requirements  High High High Moderate Low to Moderate Low 
Intellectual 
Property Entry 
Barriers  
Low Low Moderate High High Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mining/ Milling/ 
Concentration 
Separation 
(Oxides) 
Metal 
Making 
Alloying/ 
Powder 
Production 
Magnet 
Manufacturing 
Motors and 
Generators 
Market Concentration 7.5 7.5 10 10 10 5 
Market Opacity  10 10 5 5 5 1 
Capital Requirements  7.5 10 7.5 7.5 7.5 2.5 
Knowledge/ Technical 
Requirements  2.5 10 10 10 10 5 
Regulatory/ 
Requirements  10 10 10 5 2.5 1 
Intellectual Property 
Entry Barrier  1 1 5 10 10 1 
 
Note: 
• This statistic is primarily used for the visualization of Figure 9 (p.43). 
 
Source: 
 
U.S. Department of Energy, (2011). Critical Materials Strategy. [online] Available at: 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE_CMS2011_FINAL_Full.pdf [Accessed 2 Apr. 2015]. 
 
 
Translation of Nominal Values 
into ordinal (scale: 10 - 1) 
High 10 
Moderate to High 7.5 
Moderate 5 
Low to Moderate 2.5 
Low 1 
Nominal values have been given a numerical value in order to 
categorize them in an ordinal scale. Hence, this allows a visu-
alization of the market entrance characteristics associated with 
the entrance difficulty level in each stage of the supply chain. 
This statistic is primarily used for the visualization of Figure 9 
(p.43). 
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6.5 Declaration Of Originality (Eigenständigkeitserklärung) 
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